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Summary findings
Alba, Hernandez, and Klingebiel exarnine Thailand's  concentrated ownership structures, and poor accounting
macroeconomy and microeconomy for the period  and disclosure -combined  with liberalization of the
1988-97  to assess the extent to which the country's mnix  financial sector and capital accounts, increased
of macroeconomic and financial sectcr policies  vulnerability by creating incentives for risk-taking by
contributed to its economic crisis in 1997.  financial institutions.
They conclude that the crisis was fundamentally one of  Many macroeconomic fundamentals were strong, but
private sector debt, rooted in private behavior that  the combination of tight monetary policy and an
affected the magnitude and composition of investment  inflexible exchange rate created strong incentives for
and how it was financed.  residents to expose themselves to excessive foreign
Unlike the Latin American debt crisis, the Thai crisis  exchange and liquidity risks.
was not caused by excessive sovereign borrowing.  Weak corporate governance, including close corporate
Financial sector weaknesses - including inadequate  links to the banking sector, encouraged risky investments
regulation and supervision, implicit deposit insurance,  and overdiversification in the corporate sector.
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I.  Introduction
The 1980s and 1990s have been critical periods for Thailand's  development. After
an initial period of instability in the early 1980s, Thailand's  economy expanded at an
average pace of 9 percent p.a. during 1987-96, while the number of households below the
poverty line dropped from 32.6 percent in 1988 to  16.3 percent in  1996.1 During this
period,  Thailand's  economy  also  underwent deep  structural  changes,  including  the
liberalization of  its  financial sector and  the  integration of  its  economy  with  global
financial and product markets.  For example, trade as a ratio to GDP increased fromn  54
percent in 1980 to 76 percent in 1990, and further to 84 percent in 1996.2 With regard to
financial integration, according to the World Bank (1997), Thailand went from being a
country only partially integrated in  1985-87 to  one of the most  integrated emelging
market economies in 1992-94. Indeed, this period was also one during which Thailand
received very large and sustained inflows of foreign capital, averaging some 9.4 percent
of GDP p.a. during 1988-96.
The management of the economy during this period of rapid structural change and
large capital flows that started in 1988 was a major challenge for the Thai authorities.
Overall, the  key  economic objective remained to  achieve rapid growth  and  poverty
reduction  through  an  export  based  growth  strategy  that  required  maintaining
competitiveness  through  a  flexible  exchange  rate  policy,  and  improvement-s in
technology,  human capital  and  infrastructure.  In  order  to  attain this  objective, the
authorities faced, among others, two macro policy and institutional challenges during the
period 1988-96:
*  Avoiding macroeconomic overheating in  the face of  massive capital inflows and
growing financial integration that reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy; and
•  Reducing the  vulnerability of the  financial sector (which  had just  emerged from
crisis) to domestic and external shocks while liberalizing the sector and opening up to
potentially volatile capital flows.
The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges and the policy response of
the Thai authorities, in particular those that regard macroeconomic management and the
financial sector in the context of growing financial integration and liberalization.  Given
the ongoing deep financial and  economic crisis in  Thailand, it is  obvious-with  the
benefit of hindsight-that  the policies and institutional improvements implemented by
the Thai authorities during the  1980s and early 1990s were  insufficient. 3 Hence, this
paper also tries to distill lessons on how developing countries can best deal with these
challenges  and  avoid  similar  crises.  The  paper  will  not,  therefore,  focus  on  the
I  According to the poverty index compiled by the NESDB.
2  By trade we mean the sum of imports and exports of goods and nonfactor services as a ratio to GDP.
3  The magnitude and duration of the crisis in Thailand is unprecedented in recent Thai economic history.  GDP is
estimated to have declined by 0.5 percent in 1997, and is estimated to have declined by another 8 percent in
1998, with recovery only expected to begin in 1999.-4 -
management of the crisis, which has been the object of several recent contributions; the
period of analysis in the paper is 1987-96, and in only limited instances 1997, and does
not include 1998.4
The paper concludes that the crisis was fundamentally a private sector debt crisis,
rooted in private behavior regarding the magnitude of investment, its composition and
how it was financed.  Indeed, unlike the Latin American debt crisis, the Thai crisis was
not caused by excessive sovereign borrowings.  Liberalization of both financial markets
and the capital account of the balance of payments, starting with weak initial conditions
(in particular in  the financial sector), and not accompanied by  a strengthening of the
institutional and regulatory framework, led to  a rapid build-up of fragility in both the
financial and corporate sectors.  Coupled with a deficient macro-policy mix, this process
of  liberalization  led to  a  rapid build-up  of  currency  and  maturity  mismatches  that
rendered Thailand vulnerable to a reversal in capital flows and culminated in the crisis in
1997.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II examines the initial
conditions of the macro- and micro-economy at the outset of the capital inflow period in
1987/88. It assesses whether macro and micro conditions were favorable to opening up
to  foreign  capital  flows,  and  analyzes  the  institutional  environment  and  incentive
framework for financial institutions and  corporates at the onset  of the  capital inflow
period.  Section III briefly describes how the financial sector and capital account were
liberalized during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Section IV explores the consequences
of capital account and financial sector liberalization, both the macroeconomic effects -
large private capital inflows and the built up of macro-financial vulnerabilities-and  the
micro effects increased vulnerability in the financial and corporate sector.  Based on this
analysis, section  V  assesses whether  and  to  what  extent  the  macro-policy mix  and
financial sector policy measures, pursued by the government during the capital inflow
period,  avoided overheating  of  the  economy  and  strengthened  the  institutional  and
incentive framework for financial institutions and corporates.  Finally, the concluding
section summarizes the results of the analysis and provides some lessons for the future.
4  For example, Radelet and Sachs (1998).-5-
II.  Initial Conditions
This section analyzes the initial macro conditions under which the liberalization of
the financial sector and the opening of the capital account took place, to assess whether
the  overall  macro-economy  was  benign.  It  also  analyzes  the  weaknesses  in  the
institutional and incentive framework of financial institutions and corporates at the onset
of the capital inflow period. In particular, it will explore:
*  existence of imbalances at the macro level;
*  structure, conditions, and incentive framework of financial institutions; and
*  corporate governance, monitoring and performance in the real sector.
1.  The Macro Environment
Following trends  evident since 1975, the early  1980s were characterized by  large
macro imbalances fueled by rapid domestic credit expansion and loose  fiscal policy.
Domestic demand pressures and an inflexible exchange rate policy led to an appreciation
of the real effective exchange rate, a faltering export performance and a large current
account deficit over 7 percent of GDP in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In addition.,  the
Thai economy was negatively affected by several external shocks in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. These included the second oil shock in 1979, and a decline in Thai export
commodity prices that, combined, resulted in a large deterioration in the TOT equivalent
to 8 percent of GDP (Kochhar and others, 1996).
Table 1. Macro Adjustment during the 1980s
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
GDP  (Teal  %  change)  5.2%  5.9%  5.4%  5.6%  5.8%  4.6%  5.5%  9.5%  13.3%
Exports  (GNFS)  (% change  in USD)  26.6%  7.2%  0.4%  -4.7%  14.1%  -2.2%  22.0%  32.1%  39.3%
Investments  (% of GDP)  29.1%  29.7%  26.5%  30.0%  29.5%  28.2%  25.9%  27.9%K  32.6%
National Savings  (% ofGDP)  22.1%  21.S%  23.3%  22.1%  24.0%  23.9%  25.9%  26.7%,  29.6%
Current Account  (% of GDP)  -6.4%  -7.4%  -2.7%  -7.2%  -5.0%  -4.0%  0.6%  -0.7%1,  -2.7%
Fiscal Balance  (% of GDP - cy basis)  -4.7%  -4.2%  5.9%  -3.9%  -3.9%  -5.1%  -3.8%  -1.5%,  1.3%
M2  (%  change)  22.4%  -4.2%  24.1%  23.3%  20.2%  10.3%  13.2%  20.40/,  18.2%
Domestic Credit  (%  change)  18.1%  -4.2%  21.5%  26.3%  17.8%  8.4%  6.0%  17.8%  15.6%
REER  (1980=100)  100.0  102.8  105.9  108.7  107.3  95.3  85.0  79.9  77.4
Inflation  (%  change in CPI)  19.7%  12.7%  5.3%  3.7%  0.9%  2.4%  1.8%  2.5%i  3.8%
Source: World Bank Data Base
a.  The Stabilization Program of 1984-1987
In response, Thailand implemented a macro stabilization program during the period
1984-87.  The program combined a large devaluation of the nominal exchange rate in
late 1984 with tighter financial policies.  Its main features were as follows:- 6 -
*  The Baht was devalued by nearly 15 percent in nominal effective terms and then
pegged against an u.ndisclosed  basket that weighted heavily the US Dollar.  As the
Dollar lost value vs. the Yen during the second half of the 1980s, the Baht, in turn,
continued to  depreciate in  nominal terms vs.  other East Asian  currencies. These
changes, in combination with the tight financial policies, reversed the appreciating
trend of the REER during the early 1  980s and led to a lasting real depreciation of the
Bhat, which by 1987 had depreciated by 25.5 percent compared to its level in 1984.
*  Monetary policy was tightened significantly starting in  1985.  Real credit  growth
declined significantly in  1985 and  1986 as compared to the previous three years, 5
while real interest rates increased to their highest levels in the 1980s (Kochhar and
others, 1996).
*  Fiscal policy, however, was adjusted only with a one-year lag with the adoption of the
1985/86 budget in late 1985. Following a period of large deficits and no clear trend
for the fiscal stance, between 1985/86 and 1987/88 the central government's fiscal
balance went from a deficit of 5.3 percent of GDP to a surplus of 0.7 percent (Figure
1).  Hence, fiscal policy became sharply contractionary starting in 1986 as illustrated
by the large and negative estimates for the fiscal impulse.
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*  Overall BalanceM  Fiscal Impulse
Source: IMF: GFS. Authors' estimates.
5  It is difficult, however, to clisentangle the extent to which the decline in credit growth reflects tight  supply
conditions or a decline in the demand for credit, in turn, reflecting the downtum in aggregate demand.-7  -
b.  Structural Reforms
While limited progress was achieved in implementing structural reformns  in Thailand
during the  1980s, the  overall structural context was benign relative  to  other middle
income countries. In the areas of trade, investment and competition policies, and the state
enterprise  sector, micro  distortions were  not  large  to  start with  and  hence  did  not
represent a major impediment to growth during this time period.  In Thailand, the private
sector has traditionally been the main actor in economic activity and government policy
has generally been supportive of the business environment. 6
With regard to trade policy, despite early intentions already announced in  1981 to
promote exports rather than import substitution, progress was rather mixed.  While export
taxes were largely eliminated during the  1980s, efforts to  reduce import  tariffs were
frustrated  by  the  need  to  strengthen  fiscal  revenues,  leaving  the  average  effective
protection levels broadly constant at about 60 percent (Kochhar and others, 1996). While
moderate on average as compared to  other developing countries, effective protection
varied widely across industries favoring final and manufactured goods over intermediate,
capital and agricultural products.  Some import substituting sectors such as automobiles
benefited significantly from tariff and nontariff barriers (NTBs).  Battacharya and Linn
(1988) found, however, that NTBs were less widespread in Thailand than in many other
East Asian economies, but that they were not reduced during the 1980s.  The anti-export
bias of the trade regime was also reduced by the introduction of investment incentives
aimed  at  export  promotion.  In  addition,  during  this  time  period  the  authorities
successfully strengthened the operations of the various duty drawback schemes and VAT
refunds available to exporters (Robinson and others, 1991).
The Thai economic reform program was perceived to be successful: the strong inacro
adjustment combined with relatively benign structural policies led to a sharp correction in
external imbalances  and  a  strong recovery in  growth.  The program  initially  had  a
negative impact on investment and growth as a result of rising interest rates; the output
gap peaked in 1996 at about 9 percent of GDP.  By 1987, however, the investment rate
was increasing and real growth had recovered to an unprecedented 9.5 percent, while
inflation had quickly declined to low single digit levels.  On the external side, as a result
of the initial contraction in income growth combined with the sustained real depreciation,
exports boomed and there was a large adjustment in  the current account of alniost 8
percentage points of GDP between 1983 and 1986.
2.  The Financial System
At end  1987, with  financial assets to  GDP at 98.9 percent, Thailand's  financial
system was deep compared to other emerging market economies with similar per capita
income.  Much of this monetization took place at the beginning of the  1980s and was
mainly due to the fact that an increasingly large share of private savings was channeled
6  See for example, Robinson, Byeon and Teja (1991) and Kochhar and others (1996).- 8 -
into  accumulation of  financial assets. 7 The monetization  of  the  economy  led to  a
complementary rise in credit.  Credit to the private sector stood at 59 percent of GDP at
the end of 1987, up from 41 percent in 1980.  The Thai system was also bank-oriented,
with more than  67.5 percent of  financial assets in banks,  and  with  limited financial
intermediation through mutual funds and other type of institutional investors.  Bond and
stock markets remained relatively underdeveloped, with oustanding bond market issues
accounting for only  11.5 percent of GDP at end 1989, and stock market capitalization
amounting to 35.5 percent.!
a.  Structure of the Financial System
As  of  1987 Thailand's  formal financial system consisted of  commercial banks,
finance companies, credit foncier companies, Government Savings Banks, private and
government insurance comnpanies,  and a number of sectorally and functionally specialized
financial institutions. Commercial banks were the central players in the system absorbing
80.9 percent of deposits and accounting for 73.1 percent of total financial system assets 9.
Finance and securities companies accounted for 9.5 percent of total system deposits and
12.7 percent of total finarncial  system assets.  Specialized government banks had captured
9.5 percent of total financial system deposits and 14.2 percent of total financial system
assets.  '°
Commercial Banks.  At the beginning of 1988, the Baht 943 billion of commercial
banks assets (equivalent to 72.5 percent of GDP) were held by 15 domestic commercial
banks and 14 foreign banks.  Although the number of foreign banks was almost equal to
the number of domestic banks, they together accounted for around only  5 percent of
commercial banking assets.'" Their small market share was the result of tight government
restrictions, which severe:ly  limited their activities and hampered their ability to compete
with domestic banks.' 2 Ihailand's  banking industry was concentrated and characterized
by an oligopolistic market structure. The largest bank in the market, Bangkok Bank, had a
market  share of 28 percent at end 1988.  The bulk of the commercial banking system
7  World Bank (1990).  However, savers in Thailand had traditionally few alternatives to investments in bank or
finco accounts and direct investment in the equity market.  More recently, the deregulation of the mutual funds
industry has opened up alternative avenues for investments, e. g., in 1992, licenses were granted to seven fund
management companies.
8  The World Bank, 1995.
9  Excluding insurance companies and credit foncier institutions.
10  As the specialized banks are of minor importance for the analysis performed in the paper, the following sections
will only focus on commercial banks and finance companies.
I I  Bank of Thailand, Monthly Bulletin, and World Bank (1990).
12  Foreign banks faced the following three main restrictions: (i) foreign banks were  hampered in their deposit
mobilization activities as they  suffered from a prohibition of branches (only two grandfathered sub-branches
exist); (ii) they faced a 35 percent income tax which is higher than the tax rate domestic banks are subject to (as
they can be listed on the SET, their income tax rate is 30 percent); and (iii) they paid a 16.5 percent witholding
tax on dividends transferred overseas. Thus, foreign banks mainly focussed on financing of international trade
transactions; while they  are active in  the foreign exchange market, most  of  their  business relates  to trade
transactions of their own clients,  See for more detail World Bank (1990).- 9 -
assets was accounted for by four banks, one of which is government-owned (Krung Thai
Bank).  Their combined market share amounted to 63 percent of total banking system
assets (end 1988 figures).' 3 These four banks also dominated the interbank loan market
since they were the main supplier of liquidity for smaller and foreign banks.  In addition,
they were the leading players in foreign exchange transactions and thus could exert a
degree of control on the supply of foreign exchange.  The oligopolistic structure and the
lack of the threat of new entry (the last time a domestic banking license was grantecl  was
in 1965) hampered innovation and diversification in the financial system.
Commercial banks financed their activities mostly via time deposits, which at end
1987 commanded an average share of about 70 percent of total banking system deposits,
followed by savings deposits that accounted for about 30 percent of total banking system
deposits. At  end  1987  commercial banks  were  relatively  independent  from  foreign
funding: borrowings from abroad accounted for only 3.9 percent of total liabilities.
Commercial banks  focussed  their  activities on  straight  out  lending  activities:
noninterest income only amounted to  18 percent of the net operating income in 1  987.'4
As a result, at end 1987 loans to total assets amounted to 73 percent, and were dominated
by overdrafts, which accounted for an average of around 65 percent of bank  crecLit.  In
their lending activities commercial banks tended to rely more on collateral rather than on
evaluation of project viability, borrower creditworthiness, or cash flows.  Regarding the
scope of  permissible  activities, banks were  not  allowed to  engage in  any  securities
activities including brokerage of bonds and equities.
Finance Companies.  Finance companies constituted the second largest segment of
the financial system and were the most important nonbank financial institutions.  At the
end of 1987, this segment was characterized by a large number of companies with a wide
size range. Of the 93 institutions 26 were affiliated with private Thai commercial banks,
and  a  further 12  with  the  government-owned Krung Thai  Bank." 5 These  affiliated
companies were created to provide specialized services that banks were not allowed to
provide (e.g.,  securities business) or  as specialized and innovative providers  of high-
margin high-risk consumer finance.  In contrast to banks, finance companies faced stiff
competition not  only  from  other finance companies but  also  from  banks,  that  once
services proved  successful at the  finance company level  started  to  introduce  similar
services.  Moreover, finance companies faced a credible threat to entry as, in contrast to
the banking sector, new institutions entered the market. While finance companies were
13  Figures according to Bank of Asia cited in World Bank (1990).  The Herfindahl index, a measure commonly
used  to  measure  concentration  in  an  industry,  also  suggests that  the  Thai  banking  system was  highly
concentrated. If the index is adjusted for market size, among 15 developing countries Thai's banking system had
the third highest concentration in the late 1980s.  World Bank (1990).
14  World Bank (1990).
15  While a single shareholder of a finance company cannot hold more than 10 percent of total shares legally, in
practice, banks have complete control over their  affiliated company.  The legal restriction  on the extent of
ownership by one financial institution in another have only resulted in a complex network of multiple and cross
ownership between commercial banks and securities and finance companies, and the ownership structures have
become highly opaque. World Bank (1990).- 10-
typically smaller and more efficient than banks, given the number of players involved in
the thin market, and the propensity of banks to introduce competing services, finance
companies' margins were constantly under pressure.
Unlike commercial.  banks, finance and securities companies were not allowed to
take direct deposits from the public, and funded their operations primarily through the
issuance of large-denomination promissory notes" 6 (52 percent of total liabilities at the
end of 1987), as well as credit from commercial banks (19 percent) and funding from
other financial institutions (9.2 percent).  At the end of 1987 foreign lending funds were
only of marginal importance as they only comprised 1.4 percent of total liabilities." 7
Similar to commercial banks, finance companies derived the largest share of their
income (58 percent in  1988) from lending activities, while 13 percent came from hire
purchase business,  12 percent from  securities trading,  10 percent  from  dividends on
investments, and 7 percenit  from other sources.  While securities and finance companies
could engage in securities business, they were not allowed to offer overdraft facilities,
credit  cards  and  credit  facilities  related to  trade  finance,  provide  foreign  exchange
services, and  set  up branches.  Due to  commercial banks'  (funding)  cost  and  other
regulatory advantages, finance companies tended to seek profits by allocating a major
share of their portfolio into high(er) risk areas, including construction and real estate
(18.3 percent), margin loans and hire purchase (9.1 percent) and personal consumption
(25.5 percent).' 8
b.  Regulatory and Inicentive  Framework of Financial Institutions
Interest rate controls and requirements  for lending to priority sectors.  Because of
the dominant role of the banking sector, bank  interest rates were the most  important
indicators of the cost and price of capital.  At end 1987, the two most important rates-
the deposit and lending rates-were  subject to ceilings imposed by the Bank of Thailand
(BoT).  BoT also attempted to affect the allocation of bank credit across sectors via three
policy measures: (i) the requirement that commercial banks had to lend 20 percent of
their previous years deposits to the agricultural sector-any  shortfall had to be deposited
at the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperative at a rate that was below the
interbank rate; (ii) the exemption of lending to priority sectors from capital requirements;
and  (iii) access to  preferential refinancing at BoT  for  lending such  as promotion of
exports, small scale industry, and agricultural production.
16  Where these notes are payable in small denomination, they have the liquidity characteristics of demand deposits.
At the end of  1987 this  type of promissory  notes were of relative little  importance as their  share of total
promissory notes was only I O  percent.
17  While finance companies as banks came under the supervisory authority of BoT, they were subject to a separate
legal framework and were prohibited from foreign exchange transactions, from offering checking accounts, and
from opening branches.
18  Numbers according to the Bank of Thailand.  These figures are, however, likely to be understated because of
existing loopholes in the categorization of  loans as  loans are categorized according to  the business  of the
borrower not by purpose.-11  -
The External Incentive Framework. The regulatory and supervisory framework,
along with  accounting rules,  disclosure requirements, and  the existence of  a  deposit
insurance scheme, play  a crucial role in  defining the  incentive framework in which
financial institutions operate.  In particular, the extent to which excessive risk taking is
curbed by regulation, or penalized by the supervisory authority as well as by the market,
greatly influence the behavior of financial institutions.  There are three potential groups
that can monitor bank managers, namely the owners, the market, and supervisors.
At end 1987, the incentive framework of banks and finance companies appeared
relatively weak and may have been ineffective in aligning owners/managers incentives
with  prudent  banking.  For  example,  the  disciplinary  effect  of  capital  to  asset
requirements  were  lirmited due  to  the  level  and  definition  of  capital  adequacy
requirements.  While eight percent appears to be in line with the capital adequacy ratio
imposed on banks in developed markets, it appears low relative to the high risk operating
environment in which Thai financial institutions were.  Moreover, despite the fact that the
minimum level for capital is based on a narrow definition for capital, BoT permitted 31
exemptions for different classes of assets, including certain categories of risky, priority
sector loans.  In 1989, total exemptions from capital adequacy computation accounted for
approximately 40 percent of total  assets.  By permitting these exemptions BoT used
capital adequacy as a tool of economic regulation to encourage directed credit rather than
as a buffer to absorb unusual losses." 9 These capital adequacy guidelines were flrther
weakened by prudential norms on asset quality which effectively led to an overstaternent
of  capital. 20 Furthermore,  financial institutions  were  allowed  to  accrue  uncollected
interest income for up to twelve months, thereby overstating income and capital. Finally,
regulations aimed at limiting excessive exposure to a single related entity or connected
group of entities were weak and ceilings on exposure to particular "risky" sectors (to
sector which are prone to boom and bust cycles: i. e., real estate) were nonexistent.
Table 2 contains a summary of prudential regulations that Thai banks and finance
companies were subject to.  It illustrates one important point: in  spite of the fact that
finance  companies  tended  to  engage  in  riskier  activities  due  to  their  regulatory
constraints, finance companies were subject to less stringent prudential requirements than
banks.  For example, while conmmercial  banks'  capital to  asset ratio was set  at 'eight
percent, finance companies had  to hold only six percent of capital against their risky
assets.
19  World  Bank (1990).
20  Moreover, the tax treatment of provisions acted as a disincentive to adequate provisioning  since an institution
had to have exhausted nearly all legal remedies before the tax authorities would consider the loss as a deductible
expense.  World Bank (1990)--12-
Table  2.  Prudential  Regulatory  Requirements  for Commercial  Banks  and
Finance  Companies,  1990
Commercial Banks  Finance  Companies
Limits  on ownership  o  Shareholding  to one person limited  to 5  *  Shareholdings  lirnited  to  10
percent but  nominee shareholding is  percent  of shares  outstanding.
permitted.
Level  of minimum  capital  adequacy  e  8 percent  of risk  assets  for on-balance  *  6 percent  of risk assets  for balance
requirements  sheet  items;  however  number  of  sheet  risks.
exemptions  apply which  effectively  . 25  percent for  off-balance sheet
reduce  minimum  capital  adequacy  ratio  contingent  liabilities.
- considerably.
*  20 percent  in relation  to amount  of
avals,  acceptance  bills,  and loan
guarantees  outstanding.
Loan  classification requirements *  180  (uncollateralized).  *  180  (uncollateralized).
(number of  days before loan  is  *  360  (collateralized).  . 360 (collateralized).
classified  as nonperformiing)
Provisioning  requirements  for loans  *  50 percent  on doubtful.  . 50 percent  on doubtful.
classified  as nonperforming  *  0 on substandard.  *  0 on substandard.
Limit  on Risk  Exposure:
- Liquidity  Requirement  *  7 percent  of deposits.  *  NA
- Foreign  Exposure  Limit  *  Open foreign  exchange  position  limited  *  NA
to 20 percent  of capital.
- Single  Exposure  Limit  *  25 percent  of bank's capital  fund.  . 30 percent of fimance  company's
*  50 percent  for contingent  exposures.  capital  fund.
. 40  percent including contingent
__________________________________  liabilities.
- Loans  to Insiders  *  Loans  to directors  prohibited.  . NA
Market Discipline.  In Thailand, market discipline was not only hampered by a
partial implicit guarantee on financial system deposits-a  legacy of the resolution of the
1983-87  financial  crisis  (see  below)-but  also  by  loose  financial  accounting  and
disclosure.  Furthermore, the role of a limited number of families in the ownership of
both  financial  and  nonfinancial  institutions  limited  the  scope  for  market  oversight.
Indeed, each of the major banks was associated, through cross ownership and control,
with a variety of nonfinancial companies as well as with at least one, and usually more
than one,  finance company.  It has  been estimated that ten  families as of  end  1987
controlled 46.2 percent of the market capitalization of  all listed  firms, of which  39.6
percent  were  in  financial  institutions,  60.9  percent  in  nonfinancial  companies. 21
Weaknesses in the governance of financial institutions may encourage lending to risky
sectors or unviable projects.  Moreover, a bank's relationship with enterprises which are
part of its industrial financial group may not be conducted at arms-length and fair market
prices.
21  Figures  cited  after Claessens  et al (1999).- 13 -
Enforcement  through  Supervision/Regulatory  Forbearance.  The  Banlk of
Thailand had inadequate powers to intervene and close weak and insolvent institutions.
This  severely  curtailed  enforcement  of  the  prudential regulatory  framework  as  the
ultimate sanction for non-compliance-intervention  and closure of an institution--was
not  a credible threat.  Enforcement actions were  also hampered  by the  fact that the
authority to  license banks  lay with  the Ministry of Finance  while the  BoT was the
supervisory authority. Any action related to the withdrawal of a license thus needed to be
approved and coordinated with the Ministry of Finance.  And finally, banks closure had
been a very rare occurrence in Thailand.  The last time supervisors forced a bank to close
its door was in 1965.
c.  Performance and Condition of Financial Institutions
Table  3 summarizes selected performance indicators for cormmercial banks and
finance companies prior to financial sector liberalization and the opening of the capital
account.  As the table shows, the financial sector was still recovering from the 1983-87
crisis  as reflected  in  relatively weak  returns  on  assets  and  equity.  Since  financial
institutions were subject to lenient interest accrual norms-they  were allowed to accrue
interest for up to 12 month (6 months) for secured (unsecured) loans-these  performance
indicators most probably overstate profits.  Moreover, the financial sector continued to
experience portfolio problems as mirrored in  a relatively high  ratio of nonperforming
loans to total loans which amounted to 7 percent for commercial.  Similarly, a number of
finance companies  and  several banks  were  still  supported  by  the  BoT  via  various
measures.22
Table 3. Performance Indicators of
Commercial Banks and Finance Companies (%)
Commercial Banks  Fincos
1987  1988  1987  1988
ROAE  14.5  15.5  9.25  8.537
ROAA  0.8  0.9  0.51  0.7
NPL/ Total Loans  7
Provision for Loan  0.7  0.8
losses/Total Loans
Capital/Asset Ratio  5.6  5.9
Loan/Deposit Ratio  96.2  94.2  116.6  115.7
Source: World Bank 1990.
22  The  World  Bank  (1990).- 14 -
d.  Resolution of the 1983-87 Banking Crisis 23
As it has been implicit in the analysis above, to a great extent the weaknesses of
Thailand's financial system lay in the 1983-87 crisis and its resolution. In this section we
briefly summarize the main features of this crisis, its causes and the way it was resolved.
Causes and Scope of the Financial Crisis.  In  1983-87, Thailand experienced a
financial crisis that was  associated with  a  slowdown in  the  economy, globally high
interest rates, and fraud and mismanagement on the part of several finance companies and
banks. The crisis originated in the finance companies segment of the financial system,
which was poorly supervised and had engaged in heavy speculations in shares and real
estate and affected institutions that together accounted for 25 percent of total  financial
system assets. A total of 24 finance companies were subsequently closed, and nine others
merged into two  new companies. The crisis led the  Bank of  Thailand to  create the
Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF) in 1985-a  separate legal entity under
the BoT with a mandate to provide liquidity support to financial institutions.  The FI:DF
established a special support scheme-the  "April 4 Lifeboat Scheme"-which  provided
soft loans to  13 finance companies and 8 commercial banks in exchange for an equity
stake.
Treatment of Depositors. Depositors of commercial banks were largely bailed out,
thus  creating-reinforcing-expectations  of  an  implicit  insurance  guarantee  for that
market segment.  Depositors of 25 finance companies that participated in the "life-boat-
scheme" were also bailed out.  The only depositors to suffer any losses (in the form of
foregone interest and illiquidity) were the creditors of the 24 finance companies that were
closed.  Thus, despite the lack of an explicit deposit insurance scheme, the resolution of
the mid-80s crisis reinforced the belief that depositors and banks would be bailed out if
their investments proved umprofitable.
Treatment  of  Financial  Institutions'  Shareholders  and  Management.
Shareholders of insolvent financial institutions did see  a (temporary) dilution of their
investments, but they were not completely eliminated as shareholders. 24 While the chief
executive  officers  of  the  failed  and  restructured  institutions  were  removed,  senior
management was left in place.  This allowed the weak banking culture to remain intact,
and made the overall rehabilitation of the financial sector more difficult.  Moreover,
despite the  fact that  the financial crisis  of the mid  1980s was  caused by poor  risk
management and  lending practices, relatively  low average operating  expenses  in  the
afternath  of the crisis seerm  to suggest that financial institutions invested insufficiently
into upgrading the skill base of their staff and their risk management practices. 25
23  See for a detailed account of 1983 crisis: Johnston (1991) and Caprio and Klingebiel (1996a & b).
24  Existing shareholders had a buyback option at a predetermnined  price and under a five-year time horizon.
25  While the comparability of cross country  data is limited because  of differences in  accounting conventions
regarding the valuation of assets and loan loss provisioning, and interest rate  accrual norms  and tax regimes
differ across countries, with an average of 1.9 percent operating expenses over average assets over 1990-1997,- 15  -
3.  The Corporate Sector
Corporate Governance. 26 At the end of the 1980s, both corporate governance and
disclosure  systems  were  weak,  and  capital  markets  played  a  limited  role  in  the
governance of firms and exhibiting at least three interrelated problems: (i) concentrated
ownership;  (ii)  weak  information  standards;  and  (iii)  poor  protection  of  minority
shareholders.
Concentrated Ownership. One of the salient features of the corporate  sector in
Thailand is the dominance of family control over business operations.  Thai firms were
(are) generally closely held and managed by majority-often  family-interests,  while a
relatively limited number of families controlled many of the corporations listed onL  the
stock exchange.  The concentration of ownership can be largely attributed to the relative
youth  of  Thailand's  corporates as  ownership concentration is  common  in  emerging
market economies. Nevertheless, while ownership concentration can have advantages, 27
empirical  evidence  suggest  that  concentrated  ownership  structures  may  impede  the
development of professional managers that  are required as firms mature  and become
more complex, and may lead to increase risk taking by firms (in particular if ownership
links between financial and nonfinancial firms exist) as other stakeholders (creditors and
employees) share in the downside risk.  Moreover, in order not to loose control, large
shareholders have  incentives to  dilute  market pressures for  improved  disclosure and
protection for minority shareholders.
Weak Information Standards. In Thailand in the late 1980s, the scope for market
monitoring was limited as disclosure was weak and accounting standards and practices
were not up to international practice, thus limiting investors' ability to monitor corporate
performance. 28 Standards  for  financial  statement  disclosures,  asset  classification,
marketable securities, loss recognition and debt restructuring needed improvement. As
(large) firms-at  the individual firm level as well as at the country level-had  easy access
to financing, firms and insiders had little to gain from improving disclosure and corporate
governance.
Protecting  Minority  Shareholders.  An  important  factor  influencing  external
financing patterns is the degree of protection from abuse by  corporate insiders that is
provided by  legal  and regulatory mechanisms to  outside investors.  There is  growing
international evidence that  the  quality  and  efficacy of  these  protection mechanisms
influence whether and at what costs outside investors are willing to fund corporations. La
Porta et al. (1997) suggest that poor protection mechanisms will limit the availability of
Thai banks'  operating ratios were lower than  those of other East Asian economies (Philippines 4.2 percent,
Indonesia 2.9 percent, Korea 2.8 percent).  World Bank (1999).
26  See for an extended discussion Alba, Claessens, Djankov (1998).
27  It solves the agency problem since large shareholders are able to more easily assert control over a firm and limit
management inefficiency and abuse.
28  Alba, Claessens, Djankov (1998).- 16-
external finance for firms, as well as raise the cost of funds to compensate for increased
level of expropriation.  The quality of protection mechanisms depends on a variety of
factors such as the treaitment of investor rights in  company, bankruptcy and securities
legislation, the efficacy of legal enforcement, and the content and enforcement of capital
market regulation, including listing rules and disclosure. While shareholders in Thailand
appear better protected than shareholders in Latin America, the enforcement of minority
shareholder right was undermined by a weak judicial system.  According to one of the
legal sub-indices reported by La Porta et al. (1998), the efficiency of the financial system
in Thailand is the second worse among the 49 countries in their sample. 29
Performance.  In 1988, Thai corporates, which were listed on the stock exchange,
showed high profitability as their real return on  assets (ROA) amounted to about  11
percent.  It  was  significantly higher  than ROAs  that  German  (4.3  percent)  or  US
companies (4.7 percent) were reporting. Moreover, operational margins and real sales
growth, two alternative measures of profitability, seem to support the notion that Thai
corporates were quite profitable at the end of the 1980s. In 1988, (listed) Thai companies
also had-relative  to comnpanies  in developed countries-high  operational margins (22
percent versus 14.1 percent for US companies and 13.2 for German companies) and saw
their real sales grow by 12 percent, the highest for East Asian companies and twice as fast
as GeTman  or US companies. 30
4. Conclusion
As outlined above, initial conditions in the macro- and structural environment were
benign in Thailand at the onset of the capital inflow period. In contrast, conditions in the
financial and the corporate sectors were less favorable. Not only was the financial sector
still weakened from the crisis (in terms of profitability and capital position of individual
institutions) earlier in the decade, but the overall incentive framework in which financial
institutions operated remained deficient, and the regulatory and supervisory framework
was not considerably strengthened in the aftermath of the crisis.  Moreover, the scope for
moral hazard on the side of financial institutions was significant since the potential for
market oversight was limited due to poor disclosure and quality of financial information,
a  concentrated ownership structure  and  cross-ownership links  between  financial and
nonfinancial entities. In addition, incentives for market oversight were reduced because
depositors were bailed out in the last financial sector crisis.  On the corporate sector side,
while profitability  remained strong, the  governance of  corporates was weak  creating
incentives for risky investment and overdiversification.
29  La Porta et al (1998).
30  Claessens, Djankov, Lang (I998).- 17 -
III.  Liberalization of the Capital Account and Financial Sector in the
early 1990s
Against  the macro  and micro  background  analyzed  in the previous  section,  the Thai
government  embarked  on a program to further  open the capital account  and liberalize
financial  markets  in the late 1980s  and early 1990s. The main policy measures  in these
two areas  are presented  below.
1.  Liberalization  of the Capital  Account
Thailand already in  1985 maintained  relatively  open current and capital accounts,
with liberal treatment of foreign direct and portfolio investments,  although exchange
controls  still applied  to the repatriation  of interest,  dividends  and principal of portfolio
investment.  Foreign  borrowing  by Thai residents  was allowed  but subject  to registration
at the BoT.  Starting in  1985, both current and capital account transaction were
significantly  liberalized. By end 1994,  Thailand  was free of foreign  exchange  restrictions
on current  account  transactions,  and had a very open and favorable  regime for foreign
investment.  Foreign  investors  were still subject  to some  restrictions  on foreign  ownership,
in particular  with regard to companies  listed on the Stock  Exchange  of Thailand  (S:ET),
and to  severe restrictions on real estate. Thai investment overseas, in particular by
financial  intermediaries  and banks, was also restricted.  Per Johnston and others (1997),
major milestones  in the liberalization  process  between 1985-96  were the following:
*  Current  Account Transactions.  IMF article VIII obligations  were assumed in May
1990.
*  Portfolio Investment.  With regard to tax treatment,  during 1986 the authorities
reduced tax impediments  to portfolio inflows, in particular for purchasing Thai
mutual fumds.  This was followed in  1991 and 1992 by improvements  in the tax
treatment of dividends,  royalty payments, capital gains, and interest payments on
foreign debentures. In  1990, three mutual funds were created to  attract foreign
investment, and  in  1991 repatriation of  investment funds,  interest and  loan
repayments  by foreign  investors  was fully liberalized.
*  Foreign  Direct Investment.  In 1991, in addition  to amendments  in the Investment
Promotion  Act to promote  more foreign  investment,  the government  authorized  100
percent  foreign  ownership  of firms  that export  all their output.  Also, direct  investment
by Thai  residents  overseas  was also gradually  liberalized  in 1991  and 1994.
*  Foreign  Exchange  System. The most important  change  was the establishment  in 1993
of the Bangkok International  Banking Facility (BIBF)  an offshore financial  rmarket
which enjoyed tax and regulatory  advantages  aimed at fostering  the development  of
Bangkok as a regional financial  center (see Box 1). Other liberalization  meaLsures
adopted  during  the 1985-96  period included,  subjecting  nonresident  Baht accounts  at
domestic  commercial  banks to lower  reserve  requirements  and eliminating  gradlually
restrictions  of purchases of foreign exchange  by residents, and transfers of Baht
overseas.- 18 -
Box 1. The BIBF
The Bangkok  International  Banking  Facility  (BIBF)  was established  in March 1993  to facilitate  the
growth  of international  banking  business  in Thailand. As of the third quarter  of 1996,  49 banks  had been
granted BIBF licenses, including  Thai commercial  banks and foreign banks with and without local
branches  in Thailand.  The main  operations  of BIBF  banks  on the liability  side are deposits  or borrowing  in
foreign  exchange  from abroad,  mainly  through  foreign  inter-bank  transactions  and inter-office  borrowings.
On the asset side,  their main activities  are lending  in foreign  currency  to Thai residents  (out-in)  and non-
residents  (out-out). BIBF institutions  also engage in other standard  off-shore  banking activities  such as
loan syndication  and foreign  exchange  transactions  in third country  currencies,  and are also authorized  to
undertake  investnent  banking  activities.
BIBF  banks are treated  as residents  by the Bank of Thailand  for purposes  of the BOP. As result,
BIBF  funding  activities  are counted  as capital inflows  under the BOP. While this should not affect the
volume of inflows since no:rmally  the two sides are matched,  it can affect the maturity structure  of
Thailand's  external  debt. To the  extent  that  BIBF  out-in  lending  to Thai firms is replacing  other  sources  of
short-  and long-term foreign  capital,  the maturity  structure  of Thailand's external debt will shorten since
most  BIBF  funding  is short-term.  And by reducing  borrowing  costs and indirectly  easing  access  to foreign
capital markets for smaller and less well-known  Thai firms, the establishment  of the BIBF may have
increased  the magnitude  of short-term  capital  flows.
BIBF  institutions  benefited  from several  important  tax advantages.  Among  the most important  are a
reduced  corporate  income  tax (10 percent  rather  than 30 percent)  and exemption  from several  sales taxes
(3.3 percent of turnover),  stanmp  duties,  and the permanent  establishment  tax. With regard to withholding
taxes, all out-out  transactions  were exempt,  while  for out-in  transactions  the rate  is 10  percent, compared  to
15 percent for countries  that do not have a double taxation  agreement  with Thailand. And importantly,
cross border  borrowings  within  the same  institution  were exempt  from withholding  taxes. Finally,  unlike
other deposit  or deposit  type instruments,  short-term  (under 12 months)  BIBF  monetary  instruments  were
not subject  to the seven  percent  cash  reserve  requirements  favoring  a short-term  maturity  structure.
Source.  Bank of Thailand: " Analyzing Thailand's Short-term Debt."  Bank of Thailand Economic Focus, Vol. 1,
Number 3; July-September 1996.
2.  Liberalization of the Financial System
In 1990, the Thai government promulgated a comprehensive financial reforrn plan
with the stated objectives of "coordinating, synchronizing several aspects of the reform
with  the ultimate  objectives to  enhance  competitiveness,  flexibility,  efficiency, and
stability of the financial sector." 3 The main  components of the reform program are
summarized in Table 4.
Dismantling  of  Interest  Rate  Controls.  Among  the  most  important  actions
included in the reform program were the dismantling of interest rate controls over the
period 1989 to 1992.  Ceilings on commercial bank deposit rates were removed during
1989-91. In June  1992, ceilings on finance and credit foncier companies'  deposit and
lending rates, and  on commercial banks'  lending rates were  removed. However, on
October 1993, given the gap in interest rates (and spreads) between prime and non-prime
31  See Wibulswadi (1995).- 19  -
borrowers, BoT began to require banks to declare their minimum lending rate (MLR)-
the rate on term credits to large customers-,  its minimum retail rate (MRR)-the  rate on
small prime customers-,  and the widest margins charged above these rates.  The initial
"fonnula"  for the MRR was set so as to reflect commercial banks'  total cost of funds
given the deposit rates plus  the banks'  operating costs.  Deposits  banks also had  to
declare the rates for general and large deposits. 32
Relaxation of Portfolio Restrictions and Expanding  the Scope of Activities.  Also
important in the reform program were those measures that eliminated restrictions on the
scope of activity and portfolio  of financial institutions.  First, prior  requirements on
portfolio composition of commercial banks were relaxed (by expanding the definition of
agricultural credits in which  commercial banks are expected to  lend no  less than 20
percent  of  their  deposits).  Second, to  bolster the competitive position  of  domestic
financial institutions, finance companies were authorized at end 1991 to conduct leasing
business.  In March 1992, finance companies were authorized to act as selling agernts  for
government bonds, to provide economic, financial, and investment information services,
and to advise companies seeking listing on the SET.  Third, in  1992, commercial banks
were allowed to expand their areas of operation to include issuance, underwriting, and
distribution of debt securities, to act as supervisors as well as selling agents for mnutual
funds, and to become securities registrars. Finally, reserve requirements were converted
into liquid asset requirements allowing banks to invest up to 3 percent in government
paper.
32  See World Bank, Shadow Financial Sector Report (1997).-20 -
Table 4.  Overview of Financial Sector Liberalization Measures
Date  Interest Rate Controls
1987  Removal of separate interest rate ceiling for lending to priority sectors.
1989  Removal of interest rate ceiling on time deposits of commercial banks with maturity > I year.
1990  Removal of interest rate ceiling on time deposits of commercial banks with maturity < 1 year.
1991/January  Removal of interest rate ceiling on savings deposits at commercial banks.
1991/June  Removal of interest rate ceiling on finance companies' and credit foncier companies' borrowing,
deposits and lending.
1991/June  Removal of interest rate ceiling on commercial bank lending.
1993/Oct  Commercial Banks required to announce Minimum Retail Rate calculated from actual costs of
deposits and operating costs as reference lending rates for retail prime borrower.
Controls on Finance Companies' Funding Side
1990  Removal of requirement on minimum denomination of promissory notes that finance companies
can issue.
1992  Receive pernission to issue certificates of deposits.
1995  Receive permission to issue bills of exchange or certificates of deposits denominated in foreign
currencies, with maturity of over one year, to overseas investors or commercial banks authorized to
undertake foreign exchange transactions.
Controls on Portfolio Composition
1991  Broadening definition of "targeted rural credits" under the rural credit requirement to include
credits for crop wholesaling and industrial estates in rural areas.
1992/Jan  Further relaxation of rural credit requirement via:
i.  broadening definition to include credits for farmers' secondary occupation, and
credits for agricultural product wholesaling and exporting;
ii.  changing small industry definition from 5 million Baht net assets
outstanding to 10 million Baht;
iii. excluding interbank deposits from deposit base under rural credit.
Expanding the Scope of Activities of Finance Companies/Commercial Banks
1987  List of authorized business for commercial banks and finance companies was broadened to include:
i.  custodial services;
ii. loan syndication;
iii. advisory services regarding mergers and acquisition;
iv. feasibility studies.
1992/March  - Commercial banks allowed to operate as:
i. selling agents for debt instruments issued by the government and state enterprises;
ii.  information service;
iii. financial consulting service.
- Finance companies allowed to operate as:
i. selling agents for debt instruments issued by the government and state enterprises;
ii. information services;
iii. sponsoring services, preparing necessary documents for companies applying for listing on SET.
- Securities companies allowed to operate:
i. custodial service;
ii. registrar and paying agents for securities;
iii. information service;
iv. sponsoring service.
1992/June  Allowing comrnercial  banks to operate the following business:
i. arranging, underwriting and dealing in debt instruments;
ii. secured debenture holder representative;
iii. trustee o:Fmutual  funds;
iv. securities registrar;
v. selling agents for investment units.
1994/Sept  Allowing commercial banks to invest in any business, or in its shares, of not more than 10 percent
of the total amount of shares sold.
Source:  Bank  of Thailand,  Financial  Institutions  and Markets  in Thailand,  1998.-21 -
IV.  Consequences of the Liberalization of the Capital Account and the
Financial Sector
The liberalization  of the capital account  and the financial  sector resulted in rapid
build-up  of vulnerability,  a vulnerability  with both macro  and micro manifestations. On
the macro side, the liberalization  program  resulted in a surge in private capital inilows
and rapid credit growth.  The increased foreign borrowing and rapid credit growth
resulted  in high leverage  at the economy  wide level as well as an asset price bubble. 33 In
turn, this led to a rapid increase  in foreign exchange  exposure  and a shortening  cif  the
maturity structure,  rendering  the economy  vulnerable  to reversals  in capital  inflows and
downturns in  economic activity.  One micro manifestation of  the  economy wide
borrowing  binge is the rapid build-up of leverage  and the increased foreign exchange
exposure  of the corporate  sector. Similarly,  as a result of the lending  boom and coupled
with the practice of collateral  based lending,  banks and finance companies  became  more
vulnerable  to economic  shocks  in the 1990s  by: (i) lending  excessively  to sectors  or firms
whose  debt service  capacity  was particularly  susceptible  to shocks;  and (ii) reducing;  their
own capacity  to absorb  negative  shocks,  especially  by exacerbating  currency  and maturity
mismatches,  by mispricing  loans, and by underprovisioning  for future potential  losses.
This build-up  of vulnerability  is analyzed  in greater  detail  below.
1. Surge  in Capital  Inflows,  Increased  Reliance  on Foreign  Capital,  and the
Shortening  of the Maturity  Structure
Surge  in Capital  Inflows. Together  with Malaysia,  Thailand  is one of the cotmtries
that received the largest capital inflows in the East Asia region, indeed in the world,
relative to GDP.  Between 1988-96, according to data from the Bank of Thailand,
Thailand  received  a staggering  cumulative  amount  of US$ 100.3  billion, about 55 percent
of 1996  GDP,  or 9.4 percent  of GDP  on average  p.a. (excluding  errors and omissions).  As
can be seen from  Figure 7, private  capital  flows  to Thailand  surged  in 1988,  when there  is
a clear structural  break in the data. Between 1987  and 1990,  inflows increased  to some
US$1  1.1 billion, where  they stabilized  until 1993. In 1994  and especially  1995,  inflows
surged  once  again,  surpassing  US$21 billion  in 1995,  but declining  sharply in 1996.  As a
ratio to GDP  the story  is somewhat  different  (see  Figure  2 below).
33  At the microlevel, rapid credit growth strained financial institutions credit assessments' and monitoring capacity.
See Section IV2b.- 22 -
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Private capital flows were already significant in the early  1980s, but declined in
1985 and 1986 as a result of the uncertainties surrounding the macro adjustment.  Again,
the data seem to suggest a structural break in 1988, when flows increased rapidly until
1990 to about 13 percent of GDP, a local maxima. After stabilizing at about 8 percent of
GDP in 1992-94, there was a second local maxima in 1995 when flows again surpassed
12 percent of GDP.
Main  Components  of  Capital  Inflows.  The Bank  of Thailand  classifies  capital  flows
into nonbank and bank flows.  The latter are resident banks borrowing from overseas
sources (either from financial institutions or by issuing debt instruments), and, starting in
1993, a  separate category  for borrowing by BIBF banks  (see Box  1). The nonbank
categories are the following:
*  Foreign Direct Investment: including both net FDI inflows and outflows (Thai direct
investment overseas);
*  Portfolio  Capital:  distinguishing  between  fixed  income  and  equity  flows,  and
including direct investrments  by foreign residents in domestic instruments and Thai
sovereign and corporate issues overseas (e.g., eurobonds, ADRs);
*  Nonresident Baht Accounts: capital inflows deposited by nonresidents in  domestic
currency accounts in local banks mainly for investing in domestic securities;
*  Trade credits: a minor component; and
*  Other Borrowing: presumably mostly composed of syndicated borrowing by domestic
corporates from overseas financial institutions.
Bank  Intermediation.  Banks  and  finance  companies  played  a  key  role  in
intermediating capital inflows  in  Thailand  as  shown in  Figure  3.  Their net  foreign
liabilities rose from 6 percent of domestic deposit liabilities in 1990, to one third by 1996.
During the full inflow period 1988-96, bank borrowing accounted for 37 percent of total
inflows.  But this average number hides a large difference between the initial phase of the- 23 -
inflow period and the final four years,  1993-96.  Bank borrowing played a relatively
minor role during 1988-92, accounting for only 10 percent of total flows, but increased
sharply to 60 percent during 1993-96.  This occurred as a result of the establishment of
the BIBF and was due mainly to two reasons: first, as outlined above, BIBF institutions
were granted considerable tax advantages; and second, many Thai firms who could not
directly access overseas capital markets were able to borrow from BIBF Thai banks.  As a
result, foreign bank  loans through the Bangkok International Banking Facility  soared
from US$ 8 billion in 1993, its first year in operation, to US$ 50 billion in 1996, US$ 30
billion of out-in transactions and-  20 billion of out-out transactions. 34
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Nonbank Capital Inflows.  There are three salient facts regarding the composition
and trends of nonbank net capital inflows:
•  The composition of nonbank capital flows to Thailand over the full period 1988-96
has been relatively balanced.  Net foreign direct investment (22 percent), portfolio
flows  (25  percent),  nonresident Baht  deposits  (29  percent)  and  other  loans  (20
percent) all account for similar amounts.
*  Again, however, the averages hide significant changes over time.  Most importantly,
other borrowing accounted for some 41 percent of nonbank inflows over the initial
period 1988-92, but during 1993-94, there was a net  outflow  of capital under this
category.  The data suggest that Thai firms used bank lending to refinance their direct
borrowings from foreign financial institutions, especially since the establishmnent  of
the BIBF  (Figure 4).  In  1995-96,  however, as  explained below,  the authorities
implemented several measures to reduce the magnitude of bank, in particular short-
term, inflows and net direct extemal borrowing by firms became again positive.
34  Kawai (1997).- 24 -
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*  The  average numbers  also  hide  changes in  the relative  importance  of  the  other
nonbank capital inflow categories during the 1990s.  First, during  1988-92 foreign
direct investment accounted for a much larger proportion (42 percent) of nonbank
capital inflows (excluding other borrowing) than during 1993-96 (17.5 percent).  The
Bank of Thailand believes that part of this decline was due to a "significant rebooking
of FDI though BIBF" (i.e., the refinancing and new borrowings of overseas affiliates
of FDI companies, previously classified as FDI, through BIBF). Second, the relative
importance  of portfolio  flows,  especially  debt instruments,  increased  from 14 percent
to 44 percent  between  the two  periods.
Increased Reliance on Foreign  Capital and the  Shortening of  the Maturity
Structure. During  the 1990s,  the Thai economy  increased  its reliance on foreign  capital
which is reflected  in an increase  of the share of foreign debt to total debt from 59.1
percent in 1988 to 94.1 percent at the end of 1997. At the same time, changes in the
composition  of capital  inflows  during the 1990s  have increased  the proportion  of short-
term and potentially  more volatile inflows in total private capital. Important  aspects  of
this were the large increase  in BIBF inflows, the decline in FDI both in absolute and
relative  terms,  and the increase  in portfolio  flows.  Funds intermediated  through  N/R Baht
accounts,  believed  to be mainly invested  in short-term  liquid domestic  debt instruments,
as well  as in the stock  market,  have  remained  important  throughout  the whole  period.
Similarly,  these trencds  also led to a rapid  build-up  of private short-term  debt. The
Bank of Thailand estimates  that short-term  external  debt quadrupled  between 1990 and
1995,  from US$ 10 billion  to US$ 41 billion (Table  8), and doubled  as a ratio to GDP to
24 percent. The increasing  importance  of bank internediation of capital inflows in
Thailand  and the role played  by banks in the short-term  debt build-up,  in particular  since
the establishment  of the BIBF  in 1993,  are also evident:  commercial  bank debt as a share
of total  private external  debt rose  sharply  from  23 percent  to 63 percent  between  1990  and
1995, while the US$ 30 billion increase  in short-tenn  debt is fully explained  by bank
borrowing.  The financial system increased its reliance on foreign funding for their- 25 -
activities which is reflected in the rise in share of foreign liabilities to total liabilities:
foreign liabilities as a percentage of total liabilities rose from 5.4 percent (1988) to 6.45
percent (1992) to 17.4 percent (1996) (see Figure 5)."
Table 5. Private External Debt
(end of period -billion US$)
1990  1993  1994  1995  1996
Medium and Long-Term  7.4  15.4  20.2  25.1  36.2
Non-Bank  7.3  12.7  13.7  16.9  23.2
Bank Debt  0.1  2.7  6.5  8.2  13.0
BIBF  0.0  1.4  3.0  3.8  na
Other  0.1  1.3  3.5  4.4  na
Short-Term  10.1  22.7  28.9  41.0  37.6
Non-Bank  6.2  12.3  7.4  7.3  8.7
Bank  Debt  3.9  10.4  21.5  33.7  28.9
BIBF  0.0  6.4  15.1  23.7  na
Other  3.9  4.0  6.4  10.0  na
Total  Private  17.5  38.1  49.1  66.1  73.8
as%ofGDP  21%  30%  34%  39%  41%
Bank (% of total)  23%  34%  57%  63%  57%
Short-Tenn (% of GDP)  12%  18%  20%  24%  21%
Short-Term  (%  of total)  58%  60%  59%  62%  51%
Souce: BOT
Figure 5. The Share of Foreign Liabilities
and Net Foreign Liabilities of Commercial Banks
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Source: Bank of Thailand, Quarterly Bulletin.
35  The data  also illustrate  that measures  taken  in  1995-96  by  the government  to  curb  short-term  capital  inflows  (via
BIBFs)  seem  to  have  had  some  effects  (See  Section  V.2).  In  1996,  short-term,  in  particular  bank,  debt  declined
both  in  absolute  terms  and  in relative  terms,  and  as noted  above,  firms  increased  their  direct  external  borrowing.
However,  according  to World  Bank  DRS data,  the average  maturity  of private  debt  continued  to  decline  in  1996.- 26 -
2.  Rapid Growth of Credit
The  Credit Boom.  The liberalization of the  capital account  coupled with  the
liberalization of interest rates (after 1992), led to a lending boom (see Figure 12) in the
first half of the 1990s.  Total credit outstanding grew on average 22 percent p.a. in real
terms over 1988 to 1995. The loan portfolio of finance companies grew at an even faster
pace-on  average 30 percent in real terms p.a. during these years compared to 20 percent
for commercial banks (see Figure 6 below).  Overall, loan growth on average outpaced
the growth of GDP 1.8 times (or 2.3 times in the case of finance companies). 36 Finance
companies' credit grew fastest in 1992, with loans growing three times faster than GDP,
but the rate of growth has been declining since. Compared to commercial banks, finance
companies had a stronger incentive to lend because of a signal of the Bank of Thailand
suggesting that the size of their credit portfolio would be an important determining factor
for the award of a much coveted banking license, i.e., the bigger they are (in terms of
asset size) the higher the c:hances  to receive a banking license.
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36  World Bank, Shadow Financial Sector Review (1997).- 27 -
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Rising Leverage Ratios.  The rapid growth of credit was reflected in a rising credit
to GDP ratio, which increased from 64 percent in 1987 to 142 percent in 1996 (see Figure
7). The expansion of credit relative to GDP implied two problematic domestic trends.
First, the gearing of the economy increased by an average of 20 percent per year over
1990-97. Secondly, an increasing share of loans from the financial sector was fcr the
accumulation of nonproductive assets, which is reflected in decreasing returns on capital
investment. One measure of return on capital investment is the incremental capital output
ratio (ICOR), which  compares the increases in investment relative to the increases in
GDP. A rising ratio implies that investment is becoming less productive, or of lower
quality. The ICOR rose steadily in Thailand from 2.8 in  1988, to almost 5 in  1991, to
reach 6.2 in  1996.37 Also, The rising domestic debt level created an environment of
declining liquidity, as interest expenses consumed greater amounts of income (see T'ables
6 & 7 below).  Between 1988 and 1996, average interest expenses of the business sector
increased 2.5 times as a proportion of GDP, reaching 19 percent (See Section IV.2.a.).
37  See Armstrong, Garber, Spencer (1998).- 28 -
Table 6.  Thailand Goes on a Borrowing Binge
Billion Baht  as % of GDP
Commercial bank loans, Dec. 1996  4,907  110
Ex-BIBF  4,103  92
BIBF  804  18
Fincos, Sept. 1996  1,514  34
Total financial sector loans, Dec. 1996  6,421  144
Cross-border comparisons (1995 yearend)
Japan  210




Note: GDP  1996  estimate  used: 4,445  billion  Baht
Table 7. Which Raises the Interest Burden Dramatically
billion Baht  Interest rate (%)  Interest Exp.  As % of GDP
Baht-denominated loans  5,617  14.0  786  17.7
BIBF loans  804  7.0  56  1.3
Total  6,421  13.1  843  19.0
Cross-border comparisons (1995 yearend)
Japan, 1991 peak  15.3





3.  Increased Leverage of the Thai Corporate Sector
Firms in Thailand expanded quickly between 1988 and 1996 (as reflected in a rapid
increase in fixed assets), in particular in the years immediately prior to the crisis.  During
1994 to 1996, the fixed assets of Thai firms grew at 30 percent p.a. 3 The asset expansion
resulted in severely unbalanced liability structures for many firms and much of these new
assets were financed through bank debt.  As outlined above, from the late 1980s onward,
(financial and) nonfinancial corporations built up risky forms of leverage in the form of
short-term foreign currency debt.  The large rate differentials between  domestic  and
international interest rates created incentives for unhedged foreign currency borrowing,
especially at short maturity, which carried the lowest rates (the spread between local and
international rates was on average 4.1 percent in Thailand). 39 The stability of the Baht
and the perceived low risk of devaluation encouraged an open position and ignoring the
associated risk of exchange rate depreciation (see Section V.1  .c.)
38  Alba, Bhattacharya, Claessens, Gosh, Hemandez (1998).
39  The World Bank, 1998.- 29 -
During the 1990s, debt to equity ratios of Thai corporates increased significantly:
the median value rose from  1.6 in  1988 to  2.3 in  1996. During the  same period, the
maturity structure of debt shortened considerably. The share of long-term debt almost
halved, decreasing from 58 to 31 percent over that period of time. At  the same time,
foreign indebtedness increased considerably.  By 1996, the median value of foreign debt
amounted  to  80  percent  in  Thailand, and  42  percent  (median  value)  of  the  Thai
corporations' total debt was denominated in foreign currency, the bulk of which carried
short maturities (30 percent). 40
Moreover, Alba et all  1998 show that firms with  more concentrated ownership
tended to have higher leverage ratios.  These authors find that firms recording the highest
increase in leverage-an  average of 53 percent-between  1992 and  1996, were those
where the top-five owners'  concentration was 60 to 80 percent. In contrast, firms with
more dispersed ownership (below 40 percent of shares belonging to the top five owners)
show an increase in leverage of only  19 percent, on average.  Furthermore, the authors
find some support for their hypothesis that "firms with relatively worse performance got a
disproportionately large  share of  financing in  the period immediately preceeding the
crisis."
By end  1996, hence, Thailand's  firms were  highly susceptible to  liquidity and
interest rate shocks. As  a  result of  high leverage, small shocks to  interest rates, the
exchange rate or operational cash flow would greatly affect the ability of these companies
to  service their  debt.  The  high  share  of  short-term liabilities  made  them  fpirther
vulnerable to sudden swings in international investors' confidence and to the possibility
of being unable to borrow from international capital markets to roll over short-term debt
or meet other current debt service obligation.
4.  The Deterioration in the Risk Profile of Financial Institutions
The risk profile of Thai financial institutions deteriorated significantly during the
period 1990-96.  In particular, Thai banks and finance companies became more exposed
to credit risk as the quality of their portfolios deteriorated, in part because the lending
boom and enhanced competition in the financial sector led to lending to riskier firms and
without proper  credit  assessments.  Credit  risk  also  increased  because  of  increased
lending  to  risky  sectors,  and  because  borrowers  became  more  exposed  to  foreign
exchange and  interest  rate  risks.  Banks  and  finance  companies  also  became more
exposed to maturity mismatches.  In more detail, this deterioration in the risk profile is
explained below.
Impact of the Lending Boom. The rapid credit growth that took place in the early
1  990s  strained  the  expertise  of  financial  institutions  in  screening,  selecting  and
monitoring loans.  As is common in many recently liberalized systems, the skills required
to evaluate risky investment projects and monitor the borrower during the life of the loan
may have been in short supply in a banking system in which directed and collateral based
40  Figures cited from Claessens, Djankov, Lang (1998).- 30 -
lending were the primary activities for many years.  Moreover, as deposit growth did not
keep pace with loan growth, the already high loan to deposit ratio for finance companies
and  commercial banks  increased  further:  Commercial  banks'  loan  to  deposit  ratio
increased from 96 percent in 1988 to 112 percent in 1995 and from 116 percent to 138 for
finance companies respectively. 41 The increase in this ratio also reflected the fact that the
financial system (especially commercial banks) substituted higher yielding loans assets
with low margin cash or government bonds which was reflected in rising loan to deposit
ratios. Loan to deposit ration well above 100 percent made banks and finance companies
susceptible to a sudden change in investor confidence and depositor withdrawals.
Figure 8.  Composition of Commercial Banks Assets (1988-1996)
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Source: Bank of Thailand, Quarterly Bulletin.
41  World Bank, Shadow Financial Sector Review, 1997.- 31 -
Table 8.  Sectoral Breakdown of Lending Activities
(percentage  of total lending)
1988  1996
Comm. Banks  Fincos  Comm. Banks  Fincos
Agriculture,  Forestry,  and  7.1%  1.3%  3.9%  0.9%
Mining
Manufacturing  25.8%  21.8%  26.8%  15.30%)
Construction  4.3%  3.5%  4.6%  3.7%
Real estate business  6.3%  14.8%  9.1%  24.3%
Imports  5.3%  2.8%  3.2%  1.70/o
Exports  8.3%  1.3%  4.2%  0.8%/o
Wholesale and retail trade  18.9%  12.7%  17.8%  7.8%
Public utilities and services  7.3%  7.3%  10.6%  7.60/o
Banking and other financial  6.3%  9.1%  7.5%  11.0%0
business
Personal  consumption  10.3%  25.5%  12.3%  27.09/o
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.090%
Source:  Bank  of Thailand.
Lending  to Risky Sectors.  Commercial banks and finance companies did not only
increase  their  share  of risky  assets  on  their balance sheets  but  also  expanded their
exposure to "higher risk" and the non-tradable sectors of the economy (compare Table 8
and Figure  9).  This was even more the case for finance companies which expanded
rapidly their lending activities in the real estate sector (from an average  15 percent in
1988 to 24 percent in 1996 with some finance companies real estate exposure exceeding
40  percent)  and  to  loans  to  consumers.42  These  "official"  figures,  however,  are  likely  to
be  understated because of existing loopholes in the categorization of loans. 43 Market
estimates have put the overall exposure of Thai financials in the real estate sector at 30 to
40 percent. 44
42  47 percent of Financial Restructuring Agency's assets consisted of loans to real estate and construction business,
which absorbed the loan portfolio of defunct finance companies.
43  Loans are categorized according to business of the borrower not the purpose.
44  J. P. Morgan (1998).- 32 -
Figure 9.
Share of Lending and Contribution  to GDP  by  Sector
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Competition and the Customer Base.  Under  the  BIBF  umbrella,  19  new
licenses were granted to 19 foreign banks in 1993. The increasing possibilities for AAA
companies to borrow off-shore and the establishment of BIBFs increased the competitive
pressure  in  the  Thai  financial  marketplace,  especially  in  the  prime  borrower  and
multinationals segments. As a result, finance companies and commercial banks (although
to  a  lesser  extent)  lost  their  "good"  customers  as  these  now  had  more  funding
alternatives.  Nevertheless due to their aggressive lending practices, finance companies
managed to increase their overall market-share quite substantially from 12.7 percent to
21.8 percent of total financial system assets over 1988 to 1996.
Increase in Market Risk for Finance Companies. Most  commercial  banks limited
their interest rate risk exposure by extending floating rate loans to their customers, hence
transforming interest rate risk into credit risk.  Finance companies, typically extended
fixed rate loans to their custorners and increased the maturity mismatch between their
assets and liabilities considerably after 1992. Although the bulk of loans extended by
finance companies were short-term (less than one year), the average maturity of their
liabilities was much shorter than that of their assets (about 56 percent of their borrowings
had a maturity of less than three months in 1996, up from 30 percent prior to 1992).- 33 -
Figure  10.
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Performance  of  Banks'  and Finance  Companies.  Commercial banks  outgrew
their weak performance of the 1980s during 1988 to 1995. Profitability as measured in
return on  assets and  equity (See Table  9) increased considerably in  the early  1990s
because: (i)  of a restructuring of the typical balance sheet (as a  ratio to  total assets,
earning assets increased from 79 percent  in  1988 to  85 percent by  1995), (ii) lower
effective tax rates (BIBF loans were taxed at 10 percent instead of 30 percent), and (iii)- 34 -
an increase in other income (mainly earnings from securities business). 4  The increase in
interest margins can largely be attributed to the liberalization of interest rates in 1992. A
slowing of the economy along with a sharply increased off-shore borrowing by banks and
new issues of bank capital filled the banks with liquidity.  Meanwhile, the abolition of
interest rate ceilings allowed banks to increase their lending rates and decouple them
from  the deposit rates.  Nevertheless, as  mentioned before, interest  income may be
overstated as  a  result  of  the lenient  interest accrual norms.  Moreover,  despite  the
increase, net interest rate margins of banks during this period appear quite low compared
to  other  countries.  While  net  interest  rate  margins  are  a  rough  index  of  bank
(in)efficiency, low margins do not necessarily imply that banks are operating efficiently.
For example, low margins may reflect a higher loan to default ratio or may indicate that
banks are mispricing credit risk by setting margins too low. 46
While (accounting) earnings and profits improved during the 1990s, banks never
managed  to  reduce non-perforning  loans  (NPLs).  As  a  ratio  of  total  loans,  NPLs
remained around seven percent, despite the rapid loan growth during the same period
indicating that portfolio problems continued to persist.  From 1994 on, accrued interest
receivables, often a leading indicator of problem loans, started to rise considerably to 25
percent in 1994 and 27 percent in 1995.  This increase also suggests that the rapid credit
growth did  indeed strain assessment and  monitoring skills  at banks  and  made them
vulnerable to an economic downturn. 47 Due to weak loan provisioning guidelines, banks
also inadequately provisioned against specific and general loan losses. 48
Finance companies' profitability also improved during the early 1990s due to (i) an
increase in net interest rate mrargins,  (ii) a higher share of risk assets, and (iii) an increase
in  income  from  trading  and  brokerage  activities.  From  1993  to  1996,  however,
profitability of finance companies decreased quite markedly.  Most of this decline was
due to a fall in noninterest income from securities trading (which fell 77 percent during
1993-96) and brokerage fees (which decreased by 47 percent over the same period). 49
45  ROE in the 90s are most probably overstated as financial institutions were subject to lenient interest accrual and
loan loss provisioning guidelines. By the same token their capital is most likely overstated.
46  Compared to banks operating in more stable economies such as the UK and Germany (where banks recorded
average net interest margins of 2.9 and 3.1 percent respectively over 1990-1997), Thai net interest rate margins
(2.8 percent) appear out of line in terms of risk profile. Data Source: Worldscope.
47  However, the quality of the loan portfolio differed across banking institutions.  Big banks still showed moderate
levels  of nonperforming loans  and a  smaller  increase in accrued interest  while  smaller  banks were  more
adversely affected by the slowdown in the economy and the collapse of the real estate sector.
48  The tax treatment of provisions also did not provide adequate incentives for commercial banks to provision.
Thailand does not allow deductions from taxes that are greater than the lower of .25 percent of loans each year or
20 percent of interest income.
49  The stock market peaked in December 1993 and started to decline thereafter.- 35 -
Table 9.  Performance  Indicators of
Commercial Banks and Finance Companies 50
Commercial  Banks  Fincos
1995  1996  1995  1996
ROAE  30.6  21.0  20.9  16.7
ROAA  2.4  1.7  2.0  1.4
NPL/ Total Loans  3.5  5.9
Provision  for Loan  2.1  2.8  6.2  9.0
losses/Total Loans
Increase  in accrued  interest  10.0  16.9  14.6  23.5
receivable/pre-tax  profit
Capital/Asset  Ratio  8.0  8.3  11.3  10.5
Loan/Deposit  Ratio*  108.7  110.8  137.1  138.2
Source:  Bank of Thailand.
* Gross loans/notes payable for finance companies.  Gross loans to total borrowing (which included
overdrafts, rediscounts and other borrowings) reached 117.4 in 1995 and 116.5 percent in  1996.
While finance companies showed strong profits in the early nineties, the quality of
their  loan book continued  to be  problematic (Figure  12).  The portfolio deteriorated
sharply in  1995 with rising NPLs and a significant increase in  interest accrued.  This
deterioration can mainly be attributed to three factors: (i) the collapse of the property
market with its repercussion on the construction sector and the slump in the stock market;
(ii) a slowdown in the economy and high and rising interest rates that adversely affected
both  the consumer portfolio and  interest rates margins since finance companies were
highly  exposed to  interest rate risk  (see above); and (iii)  deficient risk  and  liquidity
management practices coupled with poor prudential regulation, deficient supervision and
weak enforcement.
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50  Data for finance companies reported refer to 30 largest companies in the market.  Data cited after Wotld Bank,
The Finance  Company  Sector,  World  Bank  Mimeo,  1998.- 36 -
In sum, the high growth in credit strained banks and finance companies in their
capacity to screen and assess credit risk, and led to weaker portfolios.  In addition, banks
and finance companies increased their exposure to riskier (i. e., more volatile) sectors of
the economy.  Hence, as a result of the lending boom and coupled with the practice of
collateral based  lending,  banks  and  finance  companies  became more  vulnerable  to
economic shocks in the 1990s, mainly because of two factors: (i) by lending excessively
to sectors or firms whose debt service capacity was particularly susceptible to shocks; and
(ii) by reducing their own capacity to absorb negative shocks, especially by exacerbating
currency and maturity mismatches, by mispricing loans, and by underprovisioning for
future potential losses.- 37 -
V.  Policy  Response
This section analyzes  the policy measures  implemented  by the government  in the
macro- and financial sector areas to: (i) control overheating  pressures  in the face of
massive capital inflows, (ii) create an incentive compatible environment  for market
participants  to minimize excessive  risk taking, and (iii) strengthen the regulatory and
supervisory  framework of financial institutions  and corporates.  With the benefit of
hindsight,  it is now obvious  that these policies  were insufficient. However,  they did to
some extent contain the most extreme manifestations  of overheating such as rapid
inflation  and the appreciation  of the exchange  rate, in particular  during  the early  years of
the boom in capital  inflows  and credit. But overheating  pressures  built up quickly  again
starting  in 1993  and, as discussed  in the previous  section,  the economy  at both the micro
and macro  levels  became  increasingly  vulnerable  to external  shocks. This section.,  hence,
will analyze  why  the macro and  financial  sector  policies  failed  to contain  overheating  and
vulnerability,  and indeed why they may have even contributed to  the build-up of
macrofinancial  vulnerabilities  and fragility  in the banking  and corporate  sectors.
1.  Macro  Policies
Capital  flows  can  be procyclical  for several  reasons. First, private  capital  flows  can
accommodate  excess demand pressures  as domestic residents  borrow overseas  to fund
their expansion  plans.  Second, capital flows, attracted by high potential returns, can
generate  domestic  cycles  by contributing  to domestic  investment.  Finally, capital flows
may exacerbate asset price inflation and indirectly contribute to  consumption and
investment  booms. In all three cases,  excess  demand  will be manifested  by increases  in
the current  account  if there is excess  demand  in tradables,  and  in rising inflation  if there is
excess demand in nontradables.  Excess demand for nontradables  will also lead to a
deterioration  in the current  account  as the real exchange  appreciates.
In Thailand,  the demand  pressures  were manifested  primarily  in a widening  of the
current  account  deficit,  although  there was also an increase  in inflation. As measured  by
both the current account  and inflation,  both 1990-91 and 1994-96 are the periods when
overheating  is most evident (see Figure 13) coinciding  also with the two peak:  capital
inflow  periods. During  most of the capital  inflow  period domestic  demand,  in particular
investment,  was the major contributor  to GDP growth.  The contribution  of the external
sector to GDP growth was negative in Thailand  during 1990-96, except for 1991 and
1992  when  the current  account  deficit  improved.- 38 -
Figure  13. Overheating  Symptoms
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There  are  important  differences  between  the  two  periods  when  overheating
pressures were most evident.  First, while during the period 1988-92 output recovered
quickly and grew at about 11 percent p.a. on average, it remained below or close to its
potential level.  This implies that the growth in investment was driving GDP, and also
that the increase in the current account deficit was creating productive capacity.  During
the  latter period,  1993-96,  output  growth quickly  surpassed capacity, reflecting  the
increasing importance of consumption as a source of growth as well as the decline in
investment efficiency.  For example, while the average incremental capital output ratio
during the period  1988-92 was 3.5, it increased to  5.4 for the period  1993-96.  As
mentioned before, recent studies on growth performance in Thailand also suggest that
productivity growth (TFP) was declining during this period. 5"  Second, as shown above,
short term debt intermediated by domestic banks dominated the composition of capital
inflows during the second overheating period, compared to a more balanced composition
of  equity  (including  FDI)  and  debt  during  the initial  period.  We  believe  that  the
macroeconomic policy mix is an important albeit partial explanation  of these differences.
This hypothesis  is explored further below  after analyzing the determinants of capital
inflows.
a.  Determinants of Capital Flows.
Both push and pull factors have played a role in determining private capital flows
to Thailand. The analysis focuses on the determinants of shorter term flows (net of FDI),
since as these inflows are more volatile and the primary cause of vulnerability. 52 As
described in more detail in Annex 1, bank and nonbank flows are analyzed separately
51  For example, Tinakom,  Pranee and Chalongphob Sussangorn: Total Factor Productivity  Growth in Thailand:
1980-95. Thailand Developmenr Research Institute, July 1998.
52  As a general observation, longer term FDI flows should be analyzed as a separate category since they respond to a
different set of push and pull factors than the more shorter term (portfolio) flows (Hernandez and Rudolph, 1997).
Given their longer gestation and implementation period, FDI should be sensitive to longer term trends rather than
short-term variations.- 39 -
since they may respond differently both in terms of magnitude and speed to changes in
push and pull factors.  Following the literature, the factors included in the emLpirical
analysis are the differential between foreign and domestic interest rates, a measure of
country creditworthiness, a variable measuring domestic output that serves to capture the
demand for financing (as well as prospects for the economy), and four dummy variables
to capture changes in tax adjusted rates of return and administrative controls.
The empirical analysis (see Annex 1) illustrates that high domestic interest rates were
a major factor in attracting short-term capital in Thailand during 1988 to  1992, and that
nonbank  flows were  slower  in  reacting to  the  interest  rate  differential.  The  faster
adjustment of bank flows to changes in interest rate may reflect easier access of financial
institutions to short term lines of credit overseas which in turn allows them to (quickly
take advantage of opportunities for interest arbitrage. Similarly, both bank and nonbank
flows are sensitive to  country risk.  In other words, as country risk declined over the
1990s, the same interest rate differential would lead to larger inflows of private capital.
Administrative measures regarding capital account transactions were also important
in Thailand, but seemingly more in changing the composition of flows rather than their
total magnitude.  The empirical analysis confirms that the establishment of the BIBF led
to a large increase in bank flows. It also confirms that the 7 percent reserve requirement
imposed by the BoT on foreign short-term borrowings by banks and finance companies
had a large negative impact on short-term bank inflows.  Given that bank and nonbank
flows are strong substitutes, however, the impact on total  flows of such measures is
significantly reduced although not totally offset. For example, while the establishment of
the BIBF strongly encouraged the intermediation of foreign capital by banks, it also led to
a decline in inflows interrnediated through other channels.  These results have strong
implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy.
b.  Monetary Policy
Starting in  1988, the Bank  of Thailand began  sterilizing the surge in  capital
inflows by accumulating foreign assets and receiving deposits  from the public sector.
Despite very  substantial increases in  net  foreign assets-net  foreign assets  grew on
average grew by about 54 percent per annum, and in some periods skyrocketed to as high
as 89 percent-BoT  succeeded in containing reserve money growth to an average of 17
percent during the entire period (1988:Q4-1996:Q3)  (Figure 14).
Thailand relied primarily on monetary tightening and the sterilization of capital
inflows to deal with overheating pressures resulting from an upturn in domestic demand
and capital inflows (see Annex 2).  Nevertheless, in raising interest rates, Thailand was
simply providing an  impetus for  further  capital inflows,  since  the  latter we:re very
responsive to interest arbitrage opportunities.  Indeed, as investor perceptions regarding
Thailand strengthened during this period, capital inflows became more sensitive to the
measured  interest  rate  differential.  Structural  factors  such  as  the  progressive
liberalization of the capital account during this period and the increasing familiarity of
investors with emerging markets also worked in the same direction.  Hence, monetary- 40 -
policy  during  1993-96  was  becoming  less  effective  as  an  instrument  to  deal  with
overheating and capital inflows (for example, the offset coefficient was increasing, see
Annex 2), and was in fact encouraging further inflows and the accumulation of external
short-term liabilities.
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c.  Fiscal Policy
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Despite the decreasing effectiveness of monetary policy, fiscal policy was not used
to contain overheating during the period 1993-96, and indeed may have added to demand
pressures.  As  discussed above, Thailand had  succeeded in eliminating fiscal dleficits
following the  fiscal  consolidation of  the  mid-1980s.  The  underlying  fiscal  policy
position remained strong in Thailand during 1988-1996, and Thailand recorded surpluses
every year except 1996/97.  Although fiscal surpluses declined during the period 1992-
96-as  the focus of fiscal policy shifted towards addressing infrastructure bottlenecks-
they remained around 2 percent of GDP during 1992-94.  In 1995, the fiscal surplus rose
to 2.5 percent of GDP.  However, the fiscal stance which had been expansionary in 1994
(and hence had  been  counter-cyclical given that  the  economy was not  experiencing
overheating pressures) turned slightly more  expansionary in  1995 (so that  the  fiscal
impulse was expansionary) when excess demand pressures emerged.  In 1996, the fiscal
surplus declined to  1.6 percent  of  GDP,  entailing a  strong expansionary  impulse-
although the growth of the economy had  only slowed slightly and demand pressures
remained very high as measured by the output gap and the current account deficit.  In
both years,  therefore, fiscal policy was procyclical.  The procyclical  nature of  fiscal
policy during this period is also reflected in the correlation between the fiscal impulse and
excess demand pressures in Thailand which turned positive over 1993 to  1996.  In sum,
while the fiscal stance remained conservative in Thailand over 1988-1996, fiscal policy
imparted a positive impulse to  the domestic pressures in the critical  1993-96 period,
thereby aggravating the pressure on interest rates (Figure 16).









1988/89  1989/90  1990/91  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97
*G  Central Govemment  i  General Govemment
d.  Exchange Rate Policy
From 1985 to mid-1997, the nominal exchange rate in Thailand remained fairly
constant.  Indeed, after a 10 percent devaluation in mid-1981, and another 18 percent- 42  -
devaluation in late 1984, the Baht stabilized at about Bt25 per dollar, showing only small
changes around this  value-the  average monthly variation during  this period was an
appreciation of 0.82 cents of a Baht per month, while the coefficient of variation of the
exchange rate was only 0.0253  (see Box 2).
The inflation rate in Thailand dunrng  this period also remained stable at about 0.38
percent per month, on average, with a standard deviation of about 0.45 percent.  In this
domestic environment, wit:h  an average international inflation rate at about 0.18 percent
per month-measured  by the US WPI-and  a depreciating dollar vis-a-vis other major
currencies, the real effective exchange rate in Thailand depreciated steadily until the first
quarter of 1995. The latter lrend reversed when the US dollar began appreciating vis-a-vis
the yen and other major currencies in international markets in the second quarter of 1995
(see Figure 17).
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Intemational  market  conditions  during  1985-95  facilitated  achieving  high
economic  growth  in  Tihailand-based  on  a  sustained  development  of  exports-by
maintaining a stable nominal exchange rate, despite domestic inflation being higher than
the relevant international one  (U.S.).  Indeed, the  strategy adopted by  the monetary
authorities in Thailand until the devaluation of the Baht in July 1997, was to maintain a
stable nominal exchange rate, although they systematically implemented small changes to
its  value wheniever there were signals that the differential between the  domestic and
foreign inflation rates was widening and that the real sector was growing too fast-which
could lead to potential ove:rheating. These results are obtained by estimating the BoT
exchange rate :reaction  function: i.e., by regressing the change in the exchange rate parity
(dependent vaiiable) on the domestic inflation rate, the external (U.S.) inflation rate, and
53  Average values are calculated between January 1985 and May 1997.- 43 -
a  proxy  variable measuring the  gap  between  actual output  and  its  long-term. trend
(independent variables). The estimated model is specified in equation 1 below,
(1)  AFX  =  p0 +  i1 fTdI  +  28  2  +  fi 3 7f  +  Ct  g
where AFX stands for the absolute change in the exchange rate,  ?r stands for domestic
inflation,  ;us stands  for  the  international  (US)  inflation  rate,  rg'pis the  proxy  used  for
overheating, 54 and  c is an error term.  The estimation results using monthly data under
alternative specifications of the model are reported in Annex 3.  The important result
drawn from this exercise, as discussed in Annex 3 is that,  starting in  early 1992, the
authorities partly abandoned the policy of correcting the exchange rate for changes in
inflation differentials and excessive output growth.  In other words, during 1992-96 the
policy of keeping an almost constant nominal exchange rate was strengthened, further
decreasing the perceived exchange risk and therefore giving more incentives to borrow
short-term from abroad.
In sum, the Thai authorities, concerned with preventing an appreciation of the real
exchange rate to retain Thailand's export competitiveness, maintained a pegged exchange
rate system and intervened in the foreign exchange market to maintain the peg in the face
of the large capital inflows.  By preventing the nominal exchange rate from departing
significantly from the central peg (in particular, by preventing the exchange rate from
appreciating), the policy resulted in a fairly predictable nominal exchange rate, which
reduced foreign exchange risk faced by investors and increased the incentives of domestic
residents to incur in unhedged, short-termn  foreign debt.  Hence, a more flexible exchange
rate policy could have reduced capital inflows and thus overheating pressures, obviating
the need to tighten monetary policy in the first place and avoiding the perverse cycle of
tight monetary policy,  resulting in  an  increase in  interest  rates,  attracting additional
inflows, which result in further tightening of monetary policy. 55
54  The proxy variable for overheating is based on the consumption of electricity in the Bangkok metropolitan area,
and is measured as the seasonally adjusted deviation from its long-term trend. The long-term trend is estimated
using a simple regression of consumption of electricity on time and time square. The results of this estimation are
as follows: elect =  c  +  10553 time  +  32.34 time
2
,  where both estimated coefficients resulted significant at I
percent levels and both R2 and adj-R 2 were about 96 percent.
55  A wider band would have reduced the incentives for short-term borrowing since these flows are more sensitive
than longer term flows to fluctuations around the central parity.  Long-term flows are determined by perceptions
regarding the medium- to long-term sustainability of the central parity.- 44 -
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2.  Policy Response in the Financial System
Policy measures that the government implemented in the financial system can be
grouped into two different categories: (i) (delayed) measures that were aimed at deterring
short-term capital flows through the banking system; and (ii) measures aimed at
strengthening the broader incentive framework of financial institutions.
a.  Measures aimed at Deterring (Short-term) Foreign Capital Flows
As outlined above, the government promoted BIBF operations by granting bank tax
incentives on their  BIBF operations and  excluding them  from reserve requirements,
which effectively lowered funding costs (of foreign instruments) even further.  Starting in
1995, BoT implemented measures aimed at curbing (short-term) capital flows mostly by
aligning  the  treatment  of  BIBF  transactions  with  other  bank  transactions  and  thus
reducing banks'  incentives to engage in BIBF transactions.  The measures included the
following:
Increasing the minimum credit level for credit extended through BIBF from $500,000
to $ 2 million (to ensure that loans were granted to larger size business).- 45 -
*  Raising the reserve requirement for nonresident Baht accounts from 2 to 7 percent in
late 1995.
*  Implementing  a  7  percent  cash  reserve  requirement  on  short-term  monetary
instruments under  12 months for both banking and finance companies effective on
June23,  1996.
*  Lowering the credit tax for BIBF business from 30 to 10 percent.
As described above, while these measures were successful in reducing incentives for
BIBF operations (see Annex  1), they were  of limited effectiveness in  curtailing total
short-term foreign borrowing.  As BIBF operations became more expensive, domestic
firms increased their direct foreign borrowings since they continued to remain attracted to
the  differential  between  domestic  and  international  interest  rates.  Banks  and
corporations, assuming that the currency peg credible piled on more short-term foreign
debt as it represented  (a  supposedly) low  cost and  low risk  financing  option.  And
importantly, the measures were too late in that banks and corporates had, by end 1995-
mid-1996 when these measures were implemented, highly vulnerable balance sheets.
b.  Changes to the Regulatory Regime in the Aftermath of the Liberalizatioln  of
the Financial System and the Capital Account
Financial sector liberalization and the opening of the capital account changed the
business of banking in Thailand.  For example, risky projects were usually priced out of
the  market, since lending rates were  subject to  ceilings and  banks could not  charge
appropriate  risk  premia.  When  ceilings  were  lifted  during  1992,  and  lending
requirements to priority sectors were relaxed, it became possible for financial institutions
to finance riskier ventures.  Moreover, the removal of currency controls and the set up of
BIBF operations allowed financial institutions to take on foreign exchange risk by raising
foreign currency funds on international markets and lending them to local borrowers-in
other words, transforming currency risk into credit risk by lending foreign currency to
unhedged domestic borrowers.
While liberalization increased the opportunities for financial institutions to take on
risk, financial institutions' incentives to evaluate and manage the downside risks of their
activities were not strengthened-for  instance, by increasing the capital to asset ratio and
imposing  stricter  loan  classification  and  loan  loss provisioning  guidelines-and  the
relatively weak regulatory and supervisory framework was not improved upon.  This was
compounded by the  fact that the resolution of the  crisis in  the 80s appeared to have
signaled to depositors that deposits were (implicitly) guaranteed, thus reducing incentives
for  market  monitoring  and  increasing  the  scope  for  moral  hazard.  Moreover,  as
emphasized by Caprio and Summers (1993) and Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (1994),
another factor that may have contributed to moral hazard was the reduction in franchise
value as competition increased and ceilings on interest rates were eliminated.
During the mid 1990s, attempts were made to strengthen the prudential regulatory
framework. Starting in 1993, the BoT took several measures to strengthen the prudential- 46 -
regulatory framework, albeit as Table 10 illustrates, BoT failed to bring it closer in line
with global best practice (especially in the area of loan classification and loan loss
provision guidelines, concentration and exposure ratios and limits on connected lending).
Moreover, the finance company sector remained more lightly regulated than commercial
banks despite the fact that these companies engaged in similar activities (but in riskier
market segments) as banks.
Table 10. Changes to the Regulatory and Supervisory Framework
Date  Measures
1993/January  a  Imposing  BIS capital  adequacy  standards  on commercial  banks. Initially  minimum
capital-to-risk-asset  ratio set at 7 percent  for domestic  banks  and 6 percent  for foreign
banks.
1993/December *  Increasing  minimum  capital-to-risk  ratio  to 7.5 percent  for domestic  banks  and  to 6.5
percent For  foreign  banks.
1994/June  e  Imposing  net foreign  exchange  position  limits on finance  companies  (25  percent  on
overbought  side and  20 percent  of tier I capital  on oversold  side)
a  Increasinig  minimum  reserve  for doubtful  debts  of commercial  banks from 50 to 75
percent.
1995/March  *  Commeicial  banks  have  to submit  details  of their  risk management  to BoT.
1995/December *  IncreasinIg  minimum  reserve  for doubtful  debts  of commercial  banks from  75 to 100
percent.
1996/May  *  Imposition  of 100  percent  provisioning  requirement  against  doubtful  loans  for finance
companies,  finance  and securities  companies,  and credit  foncier  companies.
1996/October  *  Increasirng  the first  tier  capital  fund  to risk asset  ratio of commercial  banks  from 5.5
percent  to 6 percent.
*  Increasirtg  the overall  capital-to-risk  asset ratio of finance  companies  to 7.5  percent
(equivalent  to commercial  banks).
1997/March  *  Further  strengthening  of the loan loss  provisioning  requirements.
Source: Bank of Thailand, Financial Instiutions and Markets in Thailand, 1998.
3.  Conclusions
Private capital flows validated and exacerbated the domestic macro cycle in Thailand,
and despite efforts to the contrary, led in several instances to  overheating pressures as
manifested by the growing current account deficit and rising inflation.  More importantly
with regard to vulnerability, however, was that the policy mix created incentives for large
current  account  deficits  tc  be  financed  through  the  rapid  build-up  of  short-term,
unhedged, external liabilities. The macro policies that jointly contributed to vulnerability
in Thailand were:
*  Monetary  policy  stance.  Monetary  policy  during  1993-96  was  becoming  less
effective as an instrument to deal with overheating and capital inflows, and was in
fact  encouraging  further  inflows,  by  raising  domestic  interest  rates,  and  the
accumulation of short-teim liabilities.
*  Exchange rate policy. By allowing the nominal exchange rate to only fluctuate in a
narrow band and by not permitting it to appreciate, Thailand's  exchange rate policy
contributed to  vulnerability most  importantly by  encouraging both  short-term and
unhedged borrowing by r educing the perceived exchange rate risk.  If authorities had
been more  flexible and  had  permitted  the  nominal  exchange  rate  to  appreciate,- 47 -
incentives to borrow abroad would decline if the rise in the value of the Baht leads to
expectations of  a future depreciation.  A more flexible exchange rate could have
reduced capital  inflows and  overheating pressures, obviating  the need  to  tighten
monetary policy and thus avoiding or reducing the perverse cycle of tight monetary
policy-additional  capital inflows and further tightening of monetary policy.
Fiscalpolicy.  Despite the fact that the underlying fiscal policy remained conservative
throughout 1987-96, fiscal policy became procyclical during 1993-96 and imparted a
positive impulse to  domestic demand pressures, thereby  aggravating pressures on
interest rates.
In the financial sector, administrative measures to curb capital inflows and dismantle
tax and other advantages were too little, too late.  Moreover, the incentive and regulatory
as well as supervisory framework which were weak at the onset of the liberalization were
not  strengthened  sufficiently  to  align  incentives  of  bank  owners,  managers  and
supervisors with  prudent  banking.  Finally,  market  discipline  continued  to  remain
severely curtailed as disclosure and accounting were not improved substantially and the
government failed to  curtail the safety net (or implicit deposit insurance), which was
implemented during the resolution of the 1983-87 crisis.- 48 -
VI.  Conclusions
In summary, the  analysis above suggests that the interaction  between macro-
policies and the institutional framework under which Thai financial institutions operated
created many vulnerabilities, which came home to roost in July 1997. The main elements
of  our conclusions  are that:  (a)  the  build-up in  vulnerability  was  rooted in  private
behavior, in particular, regarding the magnitude of investment, its composition and how it
was financed, rather than in the public sector; (b) financial sector weaknesses-including
the  inadequate  regulatoi-y and  supervisory  system,  (implicit)  deposit  insurance,
concentrated ownership structures, poor  accounting and  disclosures-combined  with
financial sector and capital account liberalization, contributed significantly to the build-
up  of  vulnerabilities by  creating  incentives  for  excessive  risk  taking  for  financial
institutions; (c) weaknesses in the governance of corporations, including close links with
the banking sector, induced risky investment and over-diversification in the corporate
sector; (d) while many aspects of the macro fundamentals were strong, the macro policy
mix that combined a tight monetary policy with an inflexible exchange rate created strong
incentives for residents to expose themselves to excessive foreign exchange and liquidity
risks.
Inadequate macro-economic policies increased vulnerabilities.  Regime shifts
in macro-financial regulation (liberalization of the capital account and financial sector in
the late  1980s and early 1990s), without an adequate upgrading of the regulatory and
supervisory framework led to rapid credit growth.  In parallel, attracted by Thailand's
rapid growth rate and improving creditworthiness, starting in 1988 there was a large surge
in net private  capital inflows.  Both, in  turn,  fueled over-investment in  unprofitable
industrial capacity and in the real estate sector, creating an  asset price boom-and-bust
cycle and macroeconomic overheating pressures.  Loans were  committed on  inflated
collateral values and often funded through (mostly short-term) foreign currency liabilities
without appropriate hedging strategies.  Monetary and exchange rate policy encouraged
off-shore short-term funding.  The macro policy mix maintained domestic interest rates
above international comparable levels, while foreign currency risk  appeared minimal
against the  background  of  stable nominal  exchange  rates.  Rapid  accumulation  of
domestic and foreign currency credit rendered the corporate sector increasingly leveraged
and vulnerable to financial shocks.
And micro-deficiencies led to poor resource allocation and added risks.  The
institutional framework affecting financial institutions was not  conducive for prudent
behavior.  The resolution of the crisis in 1983-84 did not lead to a renewal and upgrade
of managerial capabilities in  Thai  financial institutions.  Moreover, deregulation had
increased competition, resulting in a decrease in franchise value of financial institutions,
which further reduced their incentives for prudent behavior.  This was compounded by
lax  supervision  and  regulators,  which  had  weak  problem  recognition  capacity  and
engaged in forbearance.  Market oversight was limited due to the poor disclosure and
quality of financial information, a concentrated ownership structure and cross ownership
links  between  financial  and  nonfinancial  entities.  Moreover,  incentives for  market- 49 -
oversight were possibly reduced with a bailout of depositors following the mid-1980s
cnsis.
Weak  governance of  financial institutions  (due  to  a  lack  of  market  for
corporate control and nontransparent, cross ownership) allowed for bank lending to
and investment in unviable projects.  Financial institutions relied more on collateral
rather than on evaluation of project viability, or borrower creditworthiness, or cash flows,
which encouraged the build-up of real estate and equity market exposure and increased
vulnerabilities.  In addition, the lending boom strained credit assessment and monitoring
capacity of  financial institutions  and,  coupled with  insufficient internal  risk  control
mechanisms and risk management practices, rendered financial institutions vulrnerable.
Similarly, weaknesses in the governance of corporations induced risky investments and
over-diversification,  with low retums on investment.
While some of these policy distortions and institutional weaknesses had been
festering for some time, the vulnerability build-up was particularly quick and severe
during 1994-96.  On the macro side, fiscal policy on a cyclically adjusted basis was
expansionary during this time period and monetary policy bore most of the burden in
managing  the  large  overheating pressures.  Combined with  nominal  exchange  rate
stability, the macro policy mix, by increasing the risk adjusted interest rate differential, is
an important factor explaining the surge in short-tern  private capital inflows that peaked
in 1995. On the financial sector policy side, the establishment of the BIBF in late 1993 is
another significant factor in  explaining the rapid  accumulation of  short-termn  foreign
exchange liabilities.  The tax and reserve treatment of BIBF institutions acted like the
Chilean capital controls used in the 1990s but in reverse, increasing instead of dLeterring
short-term debt inflows.
Thailand is  not  the  first  country to  experience a  financial sector  crisis  after
financial sector liberalization.  Indeed, many financial liberalization episodes in the past
have led to a lending boom, increased financial fragility, and a crisis.  Examples of this
are the U.S. in the mid-1980s, Sweden, Finland and Norway in the late 1980s and early
1990s, and Mexico in  1994-95.  Nevertheless, Thailand's crisis illustrates-like  Chile's
in the early 1980s-that  opening the capital account and integrating with global financial
markets while liberalizing the domestic financial sector, should be contingent on adequate
domestic institutional development. The benefits of an open system have to be weighted
against the risk of financial crisis, especially in countries with not only fragile financial
systems but also weak regulatory and supervisory frameworks and (implicit) government
guarantees on deposits.  Moreover, the liberalization of the financial sector needs to be
carefully managed as it increases competition and thus lowers the franchise value of
(existing) financial institutions, creating incentives for unsound banking practices.- 50 -
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Annex 1. Determinants of Short-term Private Capital Flows
Following the literature, factors that may affect both bank  (FBNKS) and nonbank
flows (FNBNK), net of FDI, are the following:
*  Interest Rate Differential  (IDIF): the differential between domestic  (the interbank
rate) and foreign interest rates (dollar overnight LIBOR ). This captures both push and
pull  factors. Given the stability of the Baht/Dollar rate and the  credibility of the
exchange rate policy during the period of analysis and the lack of a complete data set
on exchange rate expectations, the rate differential is not adjusted for the depreciation
premium.  The  data  that  is  available  on  exchange  rate  expectations  of  selected
institutional investors and banks supports this unorthodox approach.6 If 1995-96 is a
representative period, investors expected the Baht/Dollar rate to hover around 25 as
shown in Figure Al -1, and the exchange rate plays only a minor role as a detenninant
of expected returns and risks.
*  The Institutional Investor  Country Rating (JIRAT): a measure of  creditworthiness.
Since this  country rating  measures country risk, it  complements the  interest rate
differential variable to  the extent that the latter does not  fully capture changes in
country risk. (It was not possible to directly account for country risk for lack of good
data on spreads demanded by the market for holding Thai sovereign dollar bonds.)
*  A Proxy  for  GDP (GE): the 12 months growth in electricity consumption.
*  Since bank and nonbank flows are strong substitutes as discussed above, it seems
plausible to include the contemporaneous  value of their counterparts in the respective
equations.
*  Four  dummy  variables  to  capture  changes  in  tax  adjusted  rates  of  return  and
administrative controls on capital inflows:
>  A dummy (DUMBIBF) to capture the impact of the establishment of the BIBF
starting in March 1993.
>  A  dummy  (DUMNRBCOAVI) to  capture  the  impact  of  the  change  in  how
commercial banks hold the 7 percent reserve requirements on NR Baht deposits.
Effective August 8,  1995, banks were  required to  hold  all  7 percent  reserve
requirements at the BoT (with no interest) rather than the previous minimum 2
percent.
>  A  dummy  (DUMNRBCON2) to  capture  the  impact  of  the  BoT  requirement,
effective April 4, 1996, for fincos to deposit at the BoT 7 percent of their short-
term  (<  1 year) Baht  currency borrowings from nonresidents.  This measure
would  indirectly  discourage NR  deposits  since  these  accounts  serve  several
purposes, including the purchase of short-term finco paper.
>  A dummy (DUMBBORCON) to capture the impact of the BoT measure, effective
June 23, 1996, that extended the 7 percent reserve requirement to all new short-
term foreign borrowings of commercial banks, BIBFs and Fincos. This measure is
designed to discourage capital inflows, especially short-term.
56  The data are from a repeated survey of investors for the period 1995-1996 on their expectations for the level of
the Baht/Dollar exchange rate.- 54 -
Table Al-I  below  shows the  surprisingly strong result.  To  avoid simultaneity
biases,  the  equations have been  estimated by  two  stage  least  squares  using  all  the
exogenous variables of both equations and lagged endogenous variables as instruments in
both equations. Both equations were estimated in levels with monthly data starting in
January 1992 as both capital inflow variables were found to be stationary.  As expected,
the two types of flows are strong substitutes during the sample period. In both equations,
the coefficients for the values of the other type of flows are large in absolute terms but
negative, and very  significant. These results  show further that pnrvate capital  flows,
however, are not sensitive to  growth performance, at least as measured by electricity
consumption.
Table Al-I
Determinants  of Bank  Intermediated  Net  Determinants  of Non-Bank  Net
Capital  Flows  (FBNKS)  Capital  Flows  (FNBNK)
(US$ millions,  monthly,  1992-96)  (US$ millions,  monthly,  1992-96)
Variable  CoefFicient  t-statistic  Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic
Constant  -12329.71  -3.65  Constant  -9278.90  -2.19
GE(-1)  1635.82  0.84  IDIF(-1)  100.31  2.58
IDIF  108.98  3.60  FBNKS  -0.32  -1.87
DUMBIBF  678.31  5.07  IIRAT  151.73  2.18
DUMBBORCON  -976.63  -2.91  FNBNK(-1)  0.38  2.81
IIRAT  196.83  3.51  DUMNRBCON2  57.38  0.21
FNBNK  -0.75  -5.67
R-square  0.75  R-square  0.61
S.E. of regression  415.45  S.E. of regression  559.56
No. of observations  55  No.  of  observation  55
Excludes FDI.
Source: Financial Times Currency Forecaster- 55 -
Figure Al-1.  Investor Expectations (annualized expected change in the
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The empirical  analysis illustrates that  high  interest rates  were  a  major  factor in
attracting short-term capital in Thailand during 1988-1992.  Moreover, the significance
of the lagged endogenous variable in the nonbank equation suggests that nonbank flows
were slower in reacting to the interest rate differential.  The faster adjustment of bank
flows to changes in interest rate may reflect easier access of financial institutions to short
term lines of credit overseas which, in turn, allows them to quickly take advantage of
opportunities for interest arbitrage. Similarly, both bank and nonbank flows are sensitive
to country risk (the coefficients are positive and significant), with a one point increase
(improvement) in the Institutional Investor rating leading to an increase in nonbank flows
of US$ 150 million, and in bank flows of US$ 200 million.  In other words, as country
risk declined over  the  1990s, the same interest rate differential would  lead to  larger
inflows of private capital.
Administrative measures regarding capital account transactions were also important
in Thailand, but seemingly more in changing the composition of flows rather than their
total magnitude.  That such measures had an impact is indicated by the large and highly
significant coefficients for two of the dummy variables.  That is, the establishment of the
BIBF led to a large increase in bank flows, while the imposition of the 7 percent reserve
requirement on foreign short-term borrowings by banks and finance companies had  a
large negative impact on bank inflows. 57 Given that bank and nonbank flows are strong
substitutes, however, the impact on total flows of such measures is significantly reduced
although not totally offset.  For example, while the establishment of the BIBF strongly
57  The controls on NR deposits do not seem to have been as significant.- 56 -
encouraged the intermnediation  of foreign capital by banks, it also led to a  decline in
inflows intennediated through other channels.- 57 -
Annex 2.  Sterilizing Private Capital Flows
To confirm that the BoT attempted to sterilize the surge in capital inflows, this
annex estimates the monetary policy reaction function of the central bank.  The policy
variable determined by the authorities is the stock of domestic assets-claims  on
government plus claims on the financial sector-which  is assumed to be affected by the
stock of foreign assets held by the central bank, the real exchange rate, and output
growth. The equation to be estimated is specified as follows:
AMP  = a +I  FAit  + VI-,  +  1n(Yt-I /t-2  )+Pt
where AMP is the change in central bank's  net domestic assets, AFA is the change in
central bank's  net  foreign assets, and p  and  Y stand  for the real  exchange rate  and
aggregate output, respectively.  The first two policy related coefficients, ,B  and X, are
expected to be negative, while the third, 6, is expected to be positive.  In other words, the
authorities are expected to  tighten monetary  policy to  compensate for larger  capital
inflows (and current account surpluses) and an appreciating real exchange rate, while they
are expected to accommodate the increases in money demand that are due to increases in
aggregate output.  The results of estimating equation using monthly data during 1986-96
are reported in Table A2-1 below.
The empirical findings confirm that the Thai monetary authorities attempted to
sterilize the inflows of foreign capital, and that they intensified their efforts starting in
late 1992 (,B  was the only coefficient that resulted significantly different from zero). This
finding is  consistent with  the fact that in  1993 the BIBF was launched  and pace of
inflows accelerated.  It is also consistent with the fact that the sterilization policy turned
less effective as the Thai economy became financially more integrated with the rest of the
world.  In other words, in order to achieve a pre-specified target for monetary growth,
during  1993-96 the authorities had to intervene by sterilizing larger volumes of ]funds.
Indeed, estimations based on a structural model of the off-set coefficient for the Thai
economy-the  degree in which a reduction in domestic credit by the central bank is off-
set by an additional inflow of foreign capital-shows  that during 1993-96 a decrease in
domestic credit by the central bank of US$ 100 was off-set within the same month by an
additional  inflow  of  US$  54.  For  the  entire  sample  period,  1986-96,  the  off-set
coefficient was only 0.38, implying an additional inflow of US$ 38 for each US$  100
reduction in domestic credit.- 58 -
Table A2-1. Regression Results
Sample  Period
1986:1  1996:11  1986:1 1991:12  1992:9  1996:11
3  - 1.09**  - 0.55*  - 1.04**
X  - 166.2  - 0.01  + 0.01
- 941.6  - 459.7  - 3038
* significant at 10% , ** significant at 5%
Note: Due to simultaneous equations bias the estimation results are obtained using instrumental variables
techniques. Instruments used were lagged AMP, lagged AFA, foreign interest rates, and monthly
dummies.- 59 -
Annex 3. The Exchange Rate Reaction Function
The results discussed in section IV are based on a regression between the change
in  the exchange rate parity (dependent variable), and the domestic inflation rate, the
external (U.S.) inflation rate, and  a proxy variable measuring the gap between actual
output and its long-term trend (independent variables).  The estimated model is specified
in equation below,
A FX  I =  PO  +  fil  ,  l +  i2  f t  -5 1 +  P 37  tgalp  +  e II
where  AFX stands for the absolute change in the exchange rate,  ?d  stands for domestic
inflation,  'US  stands for the international (U.S.) inflation rate,  yg Pis the proxy used for
overheating 58, and  E is an error tern.  The estimation results using monthly data under
alternative specifications of the model are reported in Table A3- 1 below.
Table A3-1
1986-96  1986-96  1986-91  1992-96
Dependent  Monthly AFX  3-month  3-month  3-month
Variable  moving average  moving  moving
AFX  average AFX  average AFX
- 0.012  - 0.008  - 0.017  0.003
0.041 *  0.011 *  0.019 **  0.002
P2 - 0.047**  -0.015  *  - 0.013**  -0.020
P 3 - 4.91 E-07  - 1.10 E-07 **  -2.49 E-07  - 5.27 E-09
AR(l)  0.379***  1.224***  1.292 ***  1.165***
AR(2)  - 0.189 **  - 0.613 ***  - 0.663 ***  -0.602 ***
N  128  126  60  60
R2  0.183  0.746  0.789  0.714
Adj. R2  0.149  0.735  0.769  0.687
Notes:  * significant  at 10  percent;  **  significant  at 5 percent;  *** significant  at I percent.
The results in  the first colunm of the table show that  an increase in  domestic
inflation of one percentage point (monthly) led to  a depreciation of about Bt 0.04 per
dollar the next month, while an increase in external (U.S.) inflation of one percentage
58  The proxy variable for overheating is based on the consumption of electricity in the Bangkok metropolitan
area, and is measured as the seasonally adjusted deviation from its long-term trend. The long-term trend is
estimated using a simple regression of consumption of electricity on time and time square. The results of
this estimation are as follows: elect =  c  +  10553 time  +  32.34 time2,  where both estimated coefficients
resulted significant at I percent levels and both R2 and adj-R 2 were about 96 percent.- 60 -
point led the authorities to appreciate the currency by a slightly higher magnitude. In the
long  run the  same changes  in  domestic  and  foreign inflation led  the  authorities to
depreciate the Baht by about Bt 0.05 and to appreciate it by about Bt 0.06 vis-a-vis the
dollar, respectively. Also, excessive growth in output led the authorities to appreciate the
currency by about Bt 0.5 vis-a-vis the dollar, for each MM  1 Megawatts of electricity
consumed above its trend and seasonal components. This is consistent with the view that
economic growth during this period was export driven and, therefore, an appreciation was
needed  to  slowdown  the  economy. 59 The  same excess  increase  in  output  led the
authorities to induce an appreciation of the Baht in the long run of about 60 cents per
dollar.
Changes in the exchange rate during this period were highly volatile, however,
which leads to poor overall results (measured by the adj. R2).  The second column in the
table  tries to  minimize  this  problem  by  taking  a  3-month  moving  average  of  the
dependent variable (see Figure A3-1). 60 The results are qualitatively identical to the ones
reported in the first column of the table, although the coefficients are smaller in absolute
value.  Indeed, according to  these estimates an increase in  domestic  inflation of  one
percent per month led to a depreciation by the authorities of only BtO.01 in the short-run
(about BtO.03 in the long-run), while an increase in external inflation of one percent led
to an appreciation of the Baht of about BtO.015  in the short-run (about BtO.04  in the long-
run).  Similarly, increases in output beyond its trend led to an appreciation of the Baht of
about 11 cents per dollar in the short-run and about 28 cents in the long-run.
More importantly, the evidence suggests that starting in early 1992 the authorities
partly  abandoned the policy of  correcting the exchange rate  for  changes in  inflation
differentials and excessive output growth.  Indeed, the third and fourth columns in the
table show the results of breaking down the sample into two sub-periods, 1986-91 and
1992-96.  In general, the results show smaller and insignificant coefficients during the
second half of the sample, which suggests that the results for the overall 1986-96 period
are driven by those during the first half of the sample. 61 This change in policy may have
been partly motivated by the steeper depreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis the yen during
1991-95,  which  probably  made  less  important  correcting  for  differences  between
domestic  and  foreign inflation. 62 This  finding is  robust  to  using  the change  in the
exchange rate (instead of the 3-month moving average) as the dependent variable. 63
59  An increase in the use of electricity signals an acceleration in output growth when electricity is seen as an
input in the production function.
60  The correlation of the original series with its moving average is 0.64.
6  1  Simple descriptive statistics show that the exchange rate was slightly more volatile during the first half of
the sample than during the second half: during 1986-91 the difference between the maximum and minimum
values was Btl.42  and the standard deviation 0.36, while during 1992-96 the same measures were only 1.06
and 0.23, respectively.
62  The results do not improve when using the inflation differential between the U.S. and Thailand (imposing
the restriction 81 = - 32)  instead of each inflation rate separately during the second half of the sample.
63  When using the change in the exchange rate instead of the 3-month moving average, the coefficient for
domestic inflation, BI, not only becomes insignificant (like all the other coefficients) but also turns out to
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